Ex Parte McCoy et al

17 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,568 times   187 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
  2. Graham v. John Deere Co.

    383 U.S. 1 (1966)   Cited 3,187 times   68 Legal Analyses
    Holding commercial success is a "secondary consideration" suggesting nonobviousness
  3. In re Kahn

    441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 149 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the motivation-suggestion-teaching test, much like the analogous-art test, is used to defend against hindsight
  4. Cheese Sys., Inc. v. Tetra Pak Cheese & Powder Sys., Inc.

    725 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013)   Cited 53 times
    Affirming district court's striking in part of an expert declaration that included untimely disclosures
  5. In re Bigio

    381 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 71 times   10 Legal Analyses
    Affirming conclusion that toothbrush and small hair brush were in same field of endeavor because "the structural similarities between toothbrushes and small brushes for hair would have led one of ordinary skill in the art working in the specific field of hairbrushes to consider all similar brushes including toothbrushes"
  6. Sjolund v. Musland

    847 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 94 times
    Reciting the "general principle" that "limitations from the specification are not to be read into the claims"
  7. In re Cree, Inc.

    818 F.3d 694 (Fed. Cir. 2016)   Cited 25 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "self-serving statements from researchers about their own work do not have the same reliability"
  8. In re Morris

    127 F.3d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 49 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in reviewing a claim construction decided under the ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ standard, we determine whether the interpretation is within the range of reasonableness
  9. In re Jung

    637 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 24 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding the prima facie case during patent examination “is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production” from the PTO to the patent applicant
  10. EWP Corp. v. Reliance Universal Inc.

    755 F.2d 898 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 60 times
    Finding appellants' burden of proof under section 282 to be "more easily carried" because the court did not have the benefit of the PTO's view on the validity of the references
  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,159 times   489 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  12. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 188 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  13. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  14. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)