Ex Parte McCord et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,558 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
  2. Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L

    437 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 176 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Holding that non-inventor's notebook did not corroborate reduction to practice because the non-inventor "did not testify regarding the notebook or the genuineness of its contents" and the district court was therefore "clearly reliant on the inventor to help identify the author of specific entries made in [the non-inventor's] notebook"
  3. W.L. Gore Associates, Inc. v. Garlock

    721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 327 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding the district court erred by "considering the references in less than their entireties, i.e., in disregarding disclosures in the references that diverge from and teach away from the invention at hand"
  4. Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Manufacturing Michigan Inc.

    192 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 112 times
    Holding that regardless of whether defendant had shown a motivation to combine the prior art, the showing could be rebutted by evidence of commercial success
  5. In re Fulton

    391 F.3d 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 84 times   8 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "a particular combination" need not "be the preferred, or the most desirable, combination described in the prior art in order to provide motivation"
  6. In re Gurley

    27 F.3d 551 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 102 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Upholding obviousness finding where patent was directed to one of two alternative resins disclosed in prior art reference, even though reference described claimed resin as "inferior."
  7. In re Harris

    409 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that unexpected results require a difference in kind, not merely degree (citing In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139 (Fed. Cir. 1996))
  8. In re Haruna

    249 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001)   Cited 5 times   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 00-1283. DECIDED: April 18, 2001. Appeal from the Court of Appeals, Schall, Circuit Judge. Andrew J. Patch, Young Thompson, of Arlington, VA, argued for appellants. Joseph G. Piccolo, Associate Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, of Arlington, VA, argued for appellee, Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. With him on the brief were John M. Whealan, Solicitor; and Sydney O. Johnson, Jr., Associate Solicitor. Before SCHALL, Circuit Judge, FRIEDMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and

  9. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,148 times   481 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  10. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  11. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  12. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)