Ex Parte MATTEI

10 Cited authorities

  1. In re Peterson

    315 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 69 times   14 Legal Analyses
    Holding that any overlap between a claimed range and one in the prior art is sufficient for a prima facie case of obviousness, even if insufficient to render it unpatentable
  2. In re De Blauwe

    736 F.2d 699 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 49 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Appeal No. 84-513. June 8, 1984. Jeffrey G. Sheldon, Pasadena, Cal., argued for appellants. John F. Pitrelli, Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., and John W. Dewhirst, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before BENNETT, Circuit Judge, SKELTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and MILLER, Circuit Judge. JACK R. MILLER, Circuit Judge. This appeal is from that part of the decision of the

  3. In re Baird

    16 F.3d 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 27 times
    Holding that obviousness had not been shown based on a single reference because the PTO had not demonstrated motivation to select claimed species from prior genus of millions of compounds
  4. In re Van Geuns

    988 F.2d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 21 times   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 91-1088. March 10, 1993. Jack E. Haken, U.S. Philips Corp., Tarrytown, NY, argued, for appellant. Fred E. McKelvey, Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, VA, argued, for appellee. With him on the brief, was Lee E. Barrett, Associate Sol. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Before ARCHER, PLAGER, and RADER, Circuit Judges. ARCHER, Circuit Judge. Johannes R. Van Geuns appeals from the September 25, 1990 decision of the Patent and Trademark Office

  5. Application of Aller

    220 F.2d 454 (C.C.P.A. 1955)   Cited 47 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding no criticality where claimed conditions allegedly contributed to roughly 20 percentage point improvement in yield
  6. APPLICATION OF SUSI

    440 F.2d 442 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 7 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8392. April 22, 1971. Rehearing Denied June 10, 1971. William Kaufman, Harry H. Kline, Roland A. Dexter, Stamford, Conn., attorneys of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents. R.E. Martin, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Before RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and NEWMAN Judge, United States Customs Court, sitting by designation. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the

  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,158 times   488 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  8. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 188 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  9. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  10. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)