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Ex Parte Masini-Eteve

11249122 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 16, 2016)
Ex Parte Masini-Eteve

12 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,547 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. Pfizer v. Apotex

    480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 380 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding the district court clearly erred when it failed to consider relevant prior art

  3. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.

    752 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   Cited 58 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Finding no clear error in district court's fact finding that "entecavir's ‘effectiveness against hepatitis B without known toxicity issues’ was ‘not unexpected ,’ " and deferring to district court's finding that this was not sufficient evidence of nonobviousness

  4. In re Baxter Travenol Labs

    952 F.2d 388 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 96 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Evaluating teaching of prior art at the time of disclosure

  5. In re Peterson

    315 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 67 times   14 Legal Analyses
    Holding that any overlap between a claimed range and one in the prior art is sufficient for a prima facie case of obviousness, even if insufficient to render it unpatentable

  6. Omeprazole Patent v. Apotex

    536 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008)   Cited 45 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Finding pharmaceutical formulation not ready for patenting prior to clinical trials, and noting that "[t]he existence of the formulation, however, does not establish that the Astra scientists had determined that the invention would work for its intended purpose."

  7. Merck Co., Inc. v. Biocraft Laboratories

    874 F.2d 804 (Fed. Cir. 1989)   Cited 47 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the prior art's disclosure of a multitude of combinations failed to render any particular formulation less obvious

  8. Application of Boesch

    617 F.2d 272 (C.C.P.A. 1980)   Cited 17 times

    Appeal No. 79-597. March 13, 1980. Rehearing Denied July 3, 1980. Robert F. Dropkin and Vincent G. Gioia, Pittsburgh, Pa., attorneys of record for appellants. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, John W. Dewhirst, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and MALETZ, Judges. The Honorable Herbert N. Maletz of the United States Customs Court, sitting

  9. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,130 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  10. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  11. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)