Ex Parte MacNeille et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. Phillips v. AWH Corp.

    415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 5,882 times   167 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "because extrinsic evidence can help educate the court regarding the field of the invention and can help the court determine what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand claim terms to mean, it is permissible for the district court in its sound discretion to admit and use such evidence"
  2. Vitronics Corporation v. Conceptronic, Inc.

    90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996)   Cited 4,395 times   10 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a claim construction that excludes the preferred embodiment is "rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support"
  3. Irdeto Access v. Echostar Satellite Corp.

    383 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 262 times
    Holding that "absent . . . an accepted meaning [in the art], we construe a claim term only as broadly as provided for by the patent itself"
  4. In re Am. Academy of Science Tech Ctr.

    367 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 90 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that descriptions of deficiencies of using mainframe computers set out in the "Background of the Invention" portion of the specification did not exclude mainframes from the definition of "'user computer'" where the "specification as a whole" did not express a clear disavowal of that subject matter
  5. In re Translogic Technology

    504 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 44 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Recognizing that the Supreme Court set aside the rigid application of the TSM Test and ensured use of customary knowledge as an ingredient in that equation.
  6. In re Suitco Surface

    603 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2010)   Cited 36 times   5 Legal Analyses
    In Suitco, we disagreed with the Board's broadest reasonable construction of the term "finishing the top surface of the floor," because the Board's construction "allow[ed] the finishing material to fall anywhere above the surface being finished regardless of whether it actually ‘finishes’ the surface."
  7. In re Cortright

    165 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 35 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Noting that the patent's written description must "illuminate a credible utility" to meet the enablement requirement
  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,165 times   492 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 188 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well
  12. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)