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Ex Parte Lukasik

14898260 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 14, 2019)
Ex Parte Lukasik

12 Cited authorities

  1. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC

    792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015)   Cited 614 times   28 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a means-plus-function term is indefinite "if a person of ordinary skill in the art would be unable to recognize the structure in the specification and associate it with the corresponding function in the claim"

  2. Finisar v. Directv

    523 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008)   Cited 416 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "a competent opinion of counsel concluding either [non-infringement or invalidity] would provide a sufficient basis for [the defendant] to proceed without engaging in objectively reckless behavior with respect to the [asserted] patent"

  3. Watts v. XL Systems, Inc.

    232 F.3d 877 (Fed. Cir. 2001)   Cited 503 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a patentee's representation about claim language limits that language even if it is later deleted and added elsewhere

  4. Aristocrat Tech v. Intern. Game

    521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008)   Cited 324 times   18 Legal Analyses
    Holding that in cases involving means-plus-function claims where structure is "a computer, or microprocessor, programmed to carry out an algorithm," specification must disclose corresponding algorithm to be sufficiently definite

  5. Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc.

    675 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 214 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that because Noah had made the same indefiniteness arguments during claim construction before the district court, waiver did not apply

  6. Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n

    899 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018)   Cited 49 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding that section 112, ¶ 6 applied where "the claims describe the term ... solely in relation to its function and location in the apparatus"

  7. Application of Steele

    305 F.2d 859 (C.C.P.A. 1962)   Cited 2 times

    Patent Appeal No. 6719. July 25, 1962. J. Hart Evans, Louis C. Smith, Jr., New York City, and Paul A. Rose, Washington D.C., for appellants. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, RICH, MARTIN, and SMITH, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, designated to participate in place of Judge O'CONNELL, pursuant to provisions

  8. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,289 times   1031 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it

  9. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,066 times   464 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  10. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,945 times   964 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  11. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 183 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)