2014-1798 2014-1801 05-07-2015 IN RE: MAGNA ELECTRONICS, INC., Appellant TERENCE J. LINN, Gardner, Linn, Burkhart & Flory, LLP, Grand Rapids, MI, for appellant. NATHAN K. KELLEY, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, for appellee Michelle K. Lee. Also represented by FARHEENA YASMEEN RASHEED, LORE A. UNT, THOMAS W. KRAUSE. PER CURIAM. NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and
Patent Appeal No. 75-602. December 4, 1975. Keith D. Beecher, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant. Joseph E. Nakamura, Sol., R.V. Lupo, Assoc. Sol., Washington, D.C., for Commissioner of Patents. Appeal from the Board of Appeals of the Patent and Trademark Office. MILLER, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Board of Appeals of the Patent and Trademark Office affirming the examiner's rejection of claims 5 and 6 of application serial No. 314,180, filed Dec. 11, 1972, for "Portable Moisture
Patent Appeal No. 7253. February 18, 1965. William T. Sevald, Royal Oak, Mich., for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Jere W. Sears, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH and ALMOND, Judges. MARTIN, Judge. The question the court must answer in this appeal is whether appellants' novel air cleaner, as represented by claims 1, 2 and 3 of their application serial No. 816,556 entitled "Air Cleaner" filed on May 28
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)