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Ex Parte Lipsky et al

10858860 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 13, 2013)
Ex Parte Lipsky et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,553 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. In re Huang

    100 F.3d 135 (Fed. Cir. 1996)   Cited 94 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the inventor's opinion as to the purchaser's reason for buying the product is insufficient to demonstrate a nexus

  3. In re Peterson

    315 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 68 times   14 Legal Analyses
    Holding that any overlap between a claimed range and one in the prior art is sufficient for a prima facie case of obviousness, even if insufficient to render it unpatentable

  4. Pregis Corp. v. Kappos

    700 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 42 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a party aggrieved by the result of an inter partes reexamination had an adequate remedy in a court because it "may obtain judicial review of ... [a reexamination] decision ... by appealing to the Board and then, if necessary, to this court"

  5. In re De Blauwe

    736 F.2d 699 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 49 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Appeal No. 84-513. June 8, 1984. Jeffrey G. Sheldon, Pasadena, Cal., argued for appellants. John F. Pitrelli, Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., and John W. Dewhirst, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before BENNETT, Circuit Judge, SKELTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and MILLER, Circuit Judge. JACK R. MILLER, Circuit Judge. This appeal is from that part of the decision of the

  6. In re Grasselli

    713 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 19 times
    Concluding that unexpected results “limited to sodium only” were not commensurate in scope with claims to a catalyst having “an alkali metal”

  7. Application of McLaughlin

    443 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 11 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8474. June 24, 1971. Norman Lettvin, Chicago, Ill., attorney of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; R.V. Lupo, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Before RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and RE, Judge, United States Customs Court, sitting by designation. BALDWIN, Judge. McLaughlin has appealed from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals sustaining the rejection of claims 13, 14 and 15 in his application as unpatentable

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,135 times   480 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)