Ex Parte Lips et al

13 Cited authorities

  1. Pitney Bowes v. Hewlett-Packard Company

    182 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 1,025 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that if, "when read in the context of the entire claim," the preamble "recites limitations of the claim., or . . . is `necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality' to" the claim, the preamble language is properly treated as limiting
  2. Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg

    849 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 663 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding the Board may not indefinitely stay an ex parte reexamination in light of parallel district court litigation via the "special dispatch" standard
  3. Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Ben Venue Labs

    246 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001)   Cited 278 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Holding preamble language non-limiting in method of treatment claims containing two steps, the second of which was administering a compound
  4. Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A

    868 F.2d 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1989)   Cited 389 times
    Holding that the phrase "[a]n optical waveguide" in the preamble of the claim language was meant to limit claim scope to "optical waveguides" rather than all optical fibers because the "specification [made it] clear that the inventors were working on the particular problem of an . . . optical communication system not on general improvements in conventional optical fibers"
  5. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch Lomb Inc.

    909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 318 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding § 271(c) codified common law doctrine prohibiting sale of "component" that "had no other use except with claimed product or process"
  6. IMS Technology, Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc.

    206 F.3d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 221 times
    Holding that preamble phrase "control apparatus" does not limit claim scope when it merely gives a descriptive name to the claimed invention
  7. In re Schreiber

    128 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 150 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that once the Examiner established a prima facie case of anticipation, the burden of proof was properly shifted to the inventor to rebut the finding of inherency
  8. Application of Swinehart

    439 F.2d 210 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 42 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the term "transparent" was definite because the disclosure, which showed that a substantial amount of infrared radiation was always transmitted even though the precise degree of transparency varied depending on certain factors, was sufficiently clear
  9. Application of Danly

    263 F.2d 844 (C.C.P.A. 1959)   Cited 4 times
    Limiting claims to require that the claimed device actually be connected to an alternating current source because, although the claims "do not positively recite a source of alternating current as an element of the claims," any other interpretation would render certain language in the claims meaningless
  10. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 6,020 times   1020 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"
  11. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 187 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  12. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  13. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)