Patent Appeal No. 76-610. December 9, 1976. Kenneth F. Dusyn, atty. of record, for appellants; Melvin H. Kurtz and M. Ted Raptes, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. MILLER, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board
Patent Appeal No. 8090. February 6, 1969. Harry Goldsmith, Bryant W. Brennan, Joseph G. Kolodny, Summit, N.J. (A. Ponack, Wenderoth, Lind Ponack, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for appellants. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (Raymond E. Martin, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, ALMOND and BALDWIN, Judges. ALMOND, Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the final rejection of claims
Patent Appeals No. 5317. June 3, 1947. Appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals of the United States Patent Office, Serial No. 395,235. Proceedings in the matter of the application of John C. Michalek for a patent. From a decision of the Board of Appeals of United States Patent Office affirming a decision of the primary examiner rejecting certain claims of the application, the applicant appeals. Affirmed. Pennie, Edmonds, Morton Barrows, of Washington, D.C. (Louis D. Forward, of New York City, and
Patent Appeals No. 5647. Argued November 8, 1949. Decided February 2, 1950. Willard L. Pollard, Jr., Akron, Ohio (Charles M. Thomas, Washington, D.C., and Bernard C. Frye, Akron, Ohio, of counsel), for appellant. E.L. Reynolds, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents. Before GARRETT, Chief Judge, and JACKSON, O'CONNELL, and JOHNSON, Associate Judges. JACKSON, Judge. Appellant appealed from a decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office, affirming that of the Primary
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)