Ex parte Lilly

13 Cited authorities

  1. Newell Companies, Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co.

    864 F.2d 757 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 222 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that because the record established such a strong case of obviousness based on the teachings of the prior art, the fact that the product was successful does not overcome the conclusion of obviousness
  2. In re Beattie

    974 F.2d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 63 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that an alternative to a well-entrenched theory does not preclude a finding of obviousness because the recommendation of a new system "does not require obliteration of another"
  3. In re Fine

    837 F.2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 69 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Reversing the Board's determination that dependent claims were invalid because "[d]ependent claims are nonobvious under section 103 if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious."
  4. In re Piasecki

    745 F.2d 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 73 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding nonobviousness where the evidence demonstrated a failure of others to provide a feasible solution to a longstanding problem
  5. Application of Wertheim

    541 F.2d 257 (C.C.P.A. 1976)   Cited 81 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "[i]t is immaterial in ex parte prosecution whether the same or similar claims have been allowed to others"
  6. In re Thorpe

    777 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 40 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that prior art pertinent only to product is proper ground for rejecting product-by-process claims
  7. Application of Rinehart

    531 F.2d 1048 (C.C.P.A. 1976)   Cited 45 times
    Considering the problem to be solved in a determination of obviousness
  8. In re Kulling

    897 F.2d 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 5 times
    Finding no clear error in Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences' conclusion that the amount of eluent to be used in a washing sequence was a matter of routine optimization known in the pertinent prior art and therefore obvious
  9. In re Kerkhoven

    626 F.2d 846 (C.C.P.A. 1980)   Cited 6 times   2 Legal Analyses

    Appeal No. 79-586. May 15, 1980. James J. Farrell, New York City, attorney of record, for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, and Trademarks; Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN and MILLER, Judges, and NEWMAN, Judge. The Honorable Bernard Newman, United States Customs Court, sitting by designation. NEWMAN, Judge. This is an

  10. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,172 times   492 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  11. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 99 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  12. Section 1.192-1.196 - Reserved

    37 C.F.R. § 1.192-1.196   Cited 20 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Requiring "a statement . . . that the claims of the group do not stand or fall together," and an explanation "why the claims of the group are believed to be separately patentable"
  13. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)