Ex Parte Lee et al

16 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,570 times   188 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
  2. DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co.

    464 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 138 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding based on the record that "[t]he presence of certain secondary considerations of nonobviousness are insufficient as a matter of law to overcome our conclusion that the evidence only supports a legal conclusion that claim 1 would have been obvious"
  3. Perfect Web Technologies, Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc.

    587 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 118 times   12 Legal Analyses
    Holding that “an analysis of obviousness ... may include recourse to logic, judgment, and common sense available to the person of ordinary skill [which] do[es] not necessarily require explication in any reference or expert opinion”
  4. In re Mouttet

    686 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 90 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Finding "the Board's determination that eliminating the optical components of Falk would not destroy its principle of operation to be supported by substantial evidence"
  5. Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entertainment, Inc.

    637 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 84 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding a reference analogous if it logically would have commended itself to an inventor's attention in considering his problem
  6. In re Bigio

    381 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 71 times   10 Legal Analyses
    Affirming conclusion that toothbrush and small hair brush were in same field of endeavor because "the structural similarities between toothbrushes and small brushes for hair would have led one of ordinary skill in the art working in the specific field of hairbrushes to consider all similar brushes including toothbrushes"
  7. In re Etter

    756 F.2d 852 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 121 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Noting that whether one prior art reference can be incorporated into another is "basically irrelevant."
  8. In re Clay

    966 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 88 times   10 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that a reference was not reasonably pertinent where a PHOSITA "would not reasonably have expected to solve the [relevant] problem ... by considering" that reference
  9. In re Merck Co., Inc.

    800 F.2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1986)   Cited 70 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a person of skill in the art would have expected amitriptyline to resemble imipramine in the alleviation of depression in humans because of the drugs’ close structural similarity and similar use
  10. In re Keller

    642 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 47 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating "[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference"
  11. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 188 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  12. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  13. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)