Appeal No. 79-597. March 13, 1980. Rehearing Denied July 3, 1980. Robert F. Dropkin and Vincent G. Gioia, Pittsburgh, Pa., attorneys of record for appellants. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, John W. Dewhirst, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and MALETZ, Judges. The Honorable Herbert N. Maletz of the United States Customs Court, sitting
Patent Appeal No. 8502. October 7, 1971. Alvin Guttag, Washington, D.C., attorney of record, for appellants; William T. Bullinger, Washington, D.C., Sheldon F. Raizes, Wilmington, Del., Cushman, Darby Cushman, Washington, D.C., of counsel. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Fred E. McKelvey, Washington, D.C., of counsel. ON PETITION FOR REHEARING PER CURIAM. The Patent Office petitions for a rehearing or modification of our decision, handed down June 10, 1971. The
AUGUST TERM, 1799. For the defendant in error, Dallas lamented the obvious irregularities on the face of the record, though the merits were incontestably established in his favour, by the verdict and judgment. He thought, however, that the Court would give every reasonable intendment to the allegations of the record, in support of the judgment and verdict; and, therefore, endeavoured to distinguish the present case from the case of Bingham v. Cabot et al. 3 Dall. Rep. 382. In Bingham v. Cabot et
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)