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Ex Parte Lee et al

09392243 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 4, 2005)
Ex Parte Lee et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. LTD

    927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 274 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the term "at least about" was indefinite because the patent provided no guidance as to where the line should be drawn between the numerical value of the prior art cited in the prosecution history and the close numerical value in the patent

  2. Ecolochem v. Southern California Edison

    227 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 147 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a prior-art reference did not anticipate claims 1, 4, and 7-12, but that it did anticipate claim 20

  3. Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co.

    758 F.2d 613 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 211 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Finding “substantial evidence on which a reasonable jury could have found that the inventors were correctly named” despite conflicting trial testimony

  4. In re Kotzab

    217 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 120 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that for a patent to be obvious, "there must be some motivation, suggestion or teaching of the desirability of making the specific combination that was made by the applicant."

  5. In re Fine

    837 F.2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 69 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Reversing the Board's determination that dependent claims were invalid because "[d]ependent claims are nonobvious under section 103 if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious."

  6. In re Rijckaert

    9 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 22 times   4 Legal Analyses

    No. 93-1206. November 23, 1993. Edward W. Goodman, North American Philips Corp., of Tarrytown, NY, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Algy Tamoshunas. Lee E. Barrett, Associate Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, VA, argued for appellee. With him on the brief was Fred E. McKelvey, Sol. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office. Before MAYER and LOURIE, Circuit Judges, and LAY, Senior Circuit Judge. Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the

  7. Application of Moore

    439 F.2d 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 46 times
    Noting that the question is whether the scope of enablement conveyed by the disclosure to a person of ordinary skill in the art is commensurate with the scope of protection taught by the claims

  8. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,420 times   1069 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it

  9. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,172 times   492 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  10. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 6,033 times   1028 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  11. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 99 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  12. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)