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Ex parte LEATHERMAN et al.

08662263 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 10, 1998)
Ex parte LEATHERMAN et al.

16 Cited authorities

  1. ACS Hospital Systems, Inc. v. Montefiore Hospital

    732 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 168 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that patent claims "should be so construed, if possible, as to sustain their validity"

  2. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc.

    796 F.2d 443 (Fed. Cir. 1986)   Cited 145 times
    Holding that the term "smooth," in light of the intrinsic record, "means smooth enough to serve the inventor's purpose"

  3. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Systems

    72 F.3d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996)   Cited 93 times
    Affirming finding of no intent to deceive; omitted prior art reference was in files of several employees, but evidence did not show that inventor or attorney knew of it

  4. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.

    733 F.2d 881 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 58 times
    In Lear Siegler, the holder of a patent for a brake unit sued a brake assembly manufacturer ("Aeroquip") for infringement.

  5. In re Keller

    642 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 46 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating "[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference"

  6. In re Young

    927 F.2d 588 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 17 times
    Observing that in an obviousness inquiry, courts consider a prior art "reference for what it disclose in relation to the claimed invention."

  7. In re Lalu

    747 F.2d 703 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 14 times
    Finding two cases about a different legal issue and with different facts contained dicta that "[wa]s helpful as a guide"

  8. In re Nilssen

    851 F.2d 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 10 times
    Rejecting applicant's argument that the prior art must contain an express suggestion to combine

  9. In re Boe

    355 F.2d 961 (C.C.P.A. 1966)   Cited 26 times

    Patent Appeal No. 7535. February 17, 1966. Burgess, Dinklage Sprung, Arnold Sprung, New York City, for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Jere W. Sears, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges. SMITH, Judge. The Board of Appeals affirmed the examiner's rejection of claims 9, 11 and 12 of appellant's application for patent Serial No. 845,743, filed August 12, 1959, for "Highly Porous And Absorptive

  10. In re Young

    452 F.2d 1052 (C.C.P.A. 1972)   Cited 4 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8562. January 13, 1972. R.J. Eichelburg, New York City, attorney of record, for appellants; L.C. Smith, New York City, Paul A. Rose, Washington, D.C., of counsel. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office, Board of Appeals. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges. LANE, Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Appeals affirming the

  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,129 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  12. Section 1.142 - Requirement for restriction

    37 C.F.R. § 1.142   Cited 25 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Discussing requirement for restriction

  13. Section 1.192-1.196 - Reserved

    37 C.F.R. § 1.192-1.196   Cited 20 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Requiring "a statement . . . that the claims of the group do not stand or fall together," and an explanation "why the claims of the group are believed to be separately patentable"

  14. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)