Patent Appeal No. 7131. June 11, 1964. Roy G. Story, Edward T. McCabe, Chicago, Ill., for appellants. Ellsworth H. Mosher, Washington, D.C. (Sidney A. Johnson, Dallas, Tex., of counsel), for appellee. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges. SMITH, Judge. This appeal by Swain et al. from an award of priority to Crittendon raises the single issue of whether Crittendon is entitled under 35 U.S.C. § 120 to rely upon the filing date of a parent application as establishing
Patent Appeal No. 6542. April 6, 1960. James M. Mason, Rockwell Bartholow, Edmond M. Bartholow, New Haven, Conn., for appellants. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, and SMITH, Judges and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. United States Senior Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, designated to participate in place of Judge O'CONNELL, pursuant to provisions of Section
Patent Appeal No. 5107. March 6, 1946. Appeal from the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office, Serial No. 278,027. Proceeding in the matter of the application of Joseph W. Ayers for a patent on a process of producing iron oxide. From a decision of the Board of Appeals affirming the primary examiner's final rejection of one of the claims, applicant appeals. Affirmed. Hammond Littell, of New York City (Albert C. Johnston, of New York City, of counsel), for appellant. W.W. Cochran, of Washington
Patent Appeal No. 5722. December 5, 1950. Pierce, Scheffler Parker, Washington, D.C. (Ralph E. Parker, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for appellant. E.L. Reynolds, Washington, D.C. (J. Schimmel, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for Commissioner of Patents. Before GARRETT, Chief Judge, and JACKSON, O'CONNELL, JOHNSON, and WORLEY, Judges. GARRETT, Chief Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office affirming the rejection by the Primary Examiner
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