Ex parte Kubitz

7 Cited authorities

  1. Application of Swinehart

    439 F.2d 210 (C.C.P.A. 1971)   Cited 42 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the term "transparent" was definite because the disclosure, which showed that a substantial amount of infrared radiation was always transmitted even though the precise degree of transparency varied depending on certain factors, was sufficiently clear
  2. In re Fracalossi

    681 F.2d 792 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 21 times
    Addressing whether specific anticipation rejection was sufficient evidentiary support for obviousness rejection
  3. In re Pearson

    494 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 29 times
    Affirming § 103 rejection when § 102 rejection would also have been appropriate
  4. In re Nielson

    816 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1987)   Cited 8 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Appeal No. 86-1692. Decided April 21, 1987. Philip A. Mallinckrodt, of Mallinckrodt Mallinckrodt, Salt Lake City, Utah, for appellant. Harris A. Pitlick, Associate Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, Arlington, Va., for appellee. With him on the brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Solicitor, and Fred E. McKelvey, Deputy Solicitor. Appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Before SMITH, NEWMAN, and BISSELL, Circuit Judges. PAULINE NEWMAN, Circuit Judge. Patent applicant Jay P. Nielson

  5. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,159 times   489 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  6. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 6,023 times   1024 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"
  7. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)