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Ex Parte Kostrzewa et al

12695235 (P.T.A.B. May. 3, 2018)
Ex Parte Kostrzewa et al

14 Cited authorities

  1. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International

    573 U.S. 208 (2014)   Cited 1,414 times   520 Legal Analyses
    Holding ineligible patent claims directed to the concept of "intermediated settlement," i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate the risk that only one party to an agreed-upon financial exchange will satisfy its obligation

  2. Bilski v. Kappos

    561 U.S. 593 (2010)   Cited 818 times   160 Legal Analyses
    Holding claims directed to hedging risk ineligible

  3. Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A.

    830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)   Cited 540 times   39 Legal Analyses
    Holding that claims directed to "a process of gathering and analyzing information of a specified content, then displaying the results, and not any particular assertedly inventive technology for performing those functions" are directed to an abstract idea

  4. Gottschalk v. Benson

    409 U.S. 63 (1972)   Cited 501 times   59 Legal Analyses
    Holding claim involving mathematical formula invalid under § 101 that did not preempt a mathematical formula

  5. Parker v. Flook

    437 U.S. 584 (1978)   Cited 369 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Holding narrow mathematical formula unpatentable

  6. FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc.

    839 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2016)   Cited 178 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that claims "directed to collecting and analyzing information to detect misuse and notifying a user when misuse is detected" were "directed to a combination of . . . abstract-idea categories" despite the claims' recitation of a computer

  7. Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.

    839 F.3d 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2016)   Cited 177 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that an argument about the absence of complete preemption "misses the mark"

  8. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.

    788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015)   Cited 130 times   67 Legal Analyses
    Holding ineligible the claimed process for using PCR to amplify cff-DNA in a sample before detecting it

  9. Vehicle Intelligence & Safety LLC v. Mercedes-Benz United States, LLC

    578 U.S. 1012 (2016)

    No. 15–1201. 05-31-2016 VEHICLE INTELLIGENCE AND SAFETY LLC, petitioner, v. MERCEDES–BENZ USA, LLC, et al. Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied.

  10. Vehicle Intelligence & Safety LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

    635 F. App'x 914 (Fed. Cir. 2015)   Cited 31 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Affirming district court's grant of Rule 12(c) motion following claim construction

  11. Section 101 - Inventions patentable

    35 U.S.C. § 101   Cited 3,490 times   2273 Legal Analyses
    Defining patentable subject matter as "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."

  12. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  13. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  14. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)