Ex Parte Koester et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,519 times   169 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
  2. DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co.

    464 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 134 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding based on the record that "[t]he presence of certain secondary considerations of nonobviousness are insufficient as a matter of law to overcome our conclusion that the evidence only supports a legal conclusion that claim 1 would have been obvious"
  3. In re Gurley

    27 F.3d 551 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 100 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Upholding obviousness finding where patent was directed to one of two alternative resins disclosed in prior art reference, even though reference described claimed resin as "inferior."
  4. In re Merck Co., Inc.

    800 F.2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1986)   Cited 70 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a person of skill in the art would have expected amitriptyline to resemble imipramine in the alleviation of depression in humans because of the drugs’ close structural similarity and similar use
  5. In re Keller

    642 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 43 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating "[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference"
  6. In re Haruna

    249 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001)   Cited 5 times   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 00-1283. DECIDED: April 18, 2001. Appeal from the Court of Appeals, Schall, Circuit Judge. Andrew J. Patch, Young Thompson, of Arlington, VA, argued for appellants. Joseph G. Piccolo, Associate Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, of Arlington, VA, argued for appellee, Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. With him on the brief were John M. Whealan, Solicitor; and Sydney O. Johnson, Jr., Associate Solicitor. Before SCHALL, Circuit Judge, FRIEDMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and

  7. Application of Warner

    379 F.2d 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1967)   Cited 22 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 7822. June 29, 1967. Richard E. Warner, for appellants. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (Jere W. Sears, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, RICH, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges, and WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. Senior District Judge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. SMITH, Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Appeals affirming the examiner's rejection of the appealed claims under 35 U

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,056 times   449 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 182 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)