Ex Parte Klein et al

16 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,568 times   187 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
  2. Graham v. John Deere Co.

    383 U.S. 1 (1966)   Cited 3,187 times   68 Legal Analyses
    Holding commercial success is a "secondary consideration" suggesting nonobviousness
  3. In re Fulton

    391 F.3d 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 84 times   8 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "a particular combination" need not "be the preferred, or the most desirable, combination described in the prior art in order to provide motivation"
  4. Bayer Schering Pharma AG v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.

    575 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 53 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Affirming an obviousness determination where the patentee was confronted with a limited number of options for modifying a prior art pharmaceutical composition
  5. In re Bell

    991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 32 times   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 92-1375. April 20, 1993. Robert P. Blackburn, Chiron Corp., Emeryville, CA, argued for appellant. With him on the brief were Debra A. Shetka and Thomas E. Ciotti, Morrison Foerster, Palo Alto, CA, and Donald S. Chisum, Morrison Foerster, Seattle, WA. Teddy S. Gron, Associate Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, VA, argued for appellee. With him on the brief was Fred E. McKelvey, Sol. Of counsel were John W. Dewhirst, Lee E. Barrett, Richard E. Schafer and Albin F. Drost. Appeal from the Patent

  6. Application of Rinehart

    531 F.2d 1048 (C.C.P.A. 1976)   Cited 45 times
    Considering the problem to be solved in a determination of obviousness
  7. Application of Wiggins

    488 F.2d 538 (C.C.P.A. 1973)   Cited 23 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 8806. October 11, 1973. Janes Chapman, New York City, for appellants. Leland L. Chapman, John R. Janes, New York City, of counsel. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents. Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges. ALMOND, Senior Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals sustaining the examiner's rejection of claims

  8. In re Bode

    550 F.2d 656 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 4 times

    Patent Appeal No. 76-644. February 24, 1977. Jim Zegeer, Washington, D.C., Donald Keith Wedding, Toledo, Ohio, attys. of record, for appellants. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, R.V. Lupo, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. MILLER, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals (board) affirming

  9. Dunbar v. Myers

    94 U.S. 187 (1876)   Cited 84 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Dunbar v. Myers, 94 U.S. 187, 199, 24 L.Ed. 34, the Court citing Smith v. Nichols, 21 Wall. 112, 88 U.S. 112, 22 L.Ed. 566, said: "Meritorious inventors are entitled to protection; but it is settled law that a mere carrying forward of an original patented conception, involving only change of form, proportions, or degree, or the substitution of equivalents, doing the same thing as the original invention by substantially the same means, is not such an invention as will sustain a patent, even though the changes of the kind may produce better results."
  10. Application of Jacoby

    309 F.2d 513 (C.C.P.A. 1962)   Cited 4 times

    Patent Appeal No. 6838. November 14, 1962. Henry Powers, Edward J. Mahler, Robert Alpher, New York City, and Robert H. Bachman, Hamden, Conn., for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, RICH, MARTIN, and SMITH, Judges, and Judge JOSEPH R. JACKSON, Retired. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the examiner's rejection of claims

  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,159 times   489 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  12. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 188 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  13. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  14. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well
  15. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)