Ex Parte Klasing et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,519 times   169 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
  2. In re Paulsen

    30 F.3d 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 230 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding an inventor may define specific terms used to describe invention, but must do so "with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision" and, if done, must "'set out his uncommon definition in some manner within the patent disclosure' so as to give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change" in meaning
  3. Winner Intern. Royalty Corp. v. Wang

    202 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 152 times
    Holding that "the admission of live testimony on all matters before the Board in a section 146 action, as in this case, makes a factfinder of the district court and requires a de novo trial"
  4. Dann v. Johnston

    425 U.S. 219 (1976)   Cited 88 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding it obvious to combine the modern computer program described in the patent with "existing machine systems in the banking industry"
  5. Application of Wood

    599 F.2d 1032 (C.C.P.A. 1979)   Cited 55 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding that reference in the patent's specification to a field of art encompassing the alleged prior art supported a finding that the alleged prior art was within the inventor's field of endeavor.
  6. In re Self

    671 F.2d 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 6 times

    Appeal No. 81-542. February 18, 1982. Rehearing Denied April 22, 1982. Roland T. Bryan, Stamford, Conn., for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., John W. Dewhirst, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C., for Patent and Trademark Office. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and NIES, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Appeals (board)

  7. Application of Wesslau

    353 F.2d 238 (C.C.P.A. 1965)   Cited 20 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 7447. November 26, 1965. Arnold Sprung, New York City, Arnold B. Christen, Washington, D.C., for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Fred W. Sherling, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges. ALMOND, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Board of Appeals affirming the rejection of claims 35-43 in appellant's application entitled "Process for the Production of Polyethylene

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,056 times   447 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 182 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)