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Ex Parte Kitajima et al

14413936 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 3, 2019)
Ex Parte Kitajima et al

13 Cited authorities

  1. Johnston v. Ivac Corp.

    885 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1989)   Cited 266 times
    Holding that Section 112 "operates to cut back on the types of means which could literally satisfy the claim language" and thereby "restricts the scope of the literal claim language" by requiring the structures to appear in the specification

  2. In re Huai-Hung Kao

    639 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 88 times   16 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a "food effect" was obvious because the effect was an inherent property of the composition

  3. In re Am. Academy of Science Tech Ctr.

    367 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 90 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that descriptions of deficiencies of using mainframe computers set out in the "Background of the Invention" portion of the specification did not exclude mainframes from the definition of "'user computer'" where the "specification as a whole" did not express a clear disavowal of that subject matter

  4. Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Banner

    778 F.2d 775 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 131 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Holding that an earlier species disclosure in the prior art defeats any generic claim

  5. In re Soni

    54 F.3d 746 (Fed. Cir. 1995)   Cited 92 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding "substantially improved results" to overcome obviousness when the 50-fold improvement in tensile strength was much greater than would have been predicted

  6. In re Peterson

    315 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 69 times   14 Legal Analyses
    Holding that any overlap between a claimed range and one in the prior art is sufficient for a prima facie case of obviousness, even if insufficient to render it unpatentable

  7. Velander v. Garner

    348 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 62 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Reviewing the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences' finding of a reasonable expectation of success under a "substantial evidence" standard

  8. In re Harris

    409 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that unexpected results require a difference in kind, not merely degree (citing In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139 (Fed. Cir. 1996))

  9. In re Pearson

    494 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 29 times
    Concluding a compound was undisputedly taught in the prior art and then determining that additional limitations that merely "set forth the intended use for, or a property inherent in, an otherwise old composition . . . do not differentiate the claimed composition from those known to the prior art"

  10. Application of Aller

    220 F.2d 454 (C.C.P.A. 1955)   Cited 47 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding no criticality where claimed conditions allegedly contributed to roughly 20 percentage point improvement in yield

  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,174 times   493 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  12. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 99 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  13. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)