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Ex Parte KIM

31 Cited authorities

  1. Graham v. John Deere Co.

    383 U.S. 1 (1966)   Cited 3,190 times   68 Legal Analyses
    Holding commercial success is a "secondary consideration" suggesting nonobviousness

  2. Comark Communications v. Harris Corp.

    156 F.3d 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1998)   Cited 1,196 times
    Holding the "doctrine of claim differentiation create a presumption that each claim in a patent has a different scope"

  3. Karlin Tech. v. Surgical Dynamics, Inc.

    177 F.3d 968 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 227 times
    Holding it improper to read the limitation in the dependent claims "into the independent claim from which they depend"

  4. Transmatic, Inc. v. Gulton Industries, Inc.

    53 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1995)   Cited 177 times
    Holding that the district court erred by importing functional limitations into a structural claim element because functions that are not recited in a claim are not legally relevant to the literal language of the claim

  5. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co.

    810 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1987)   Cited 203 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that §§ 103 and 102 use the same definition of prior art

  6. McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc.

    262 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001)   Cited 116 times
    Affirming identification of corresponding structure as including "egg-shaped indicia having `a slight taper at the portion of each indicia situated closest to the palm of the hand, and any equivalents of such structure'"

  7. In re Sang-Su Lee

    277 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002)   Cited 106 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Holding that agency tribunals "must make findings of relevant facts, and present its reasoning in sufficient detail that the court may conduct meaningful review of the agency action"

  8. In re Dembiczak

    175 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 93 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Refusing to consider an obviousness rejection raised for the first time on appeal from the PTO

  9. In re Oetiker

    977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 66 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Reversing for "improperly combined" references, because "[i]f examination at the initial stage does not produce a prima facie case of unpatentability, then without more the applicant is entitled to grant of the patent"

  10. In re Kaslow

    707 F.2d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 75 times
    Holding that prior demonstration of computerized supermarket UPC code system was prior use under meaning of Section 102(b)

  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,174 times   493 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  12. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 99 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  13. Section 1.192-1.196 - Reserved

    37 C.F.R. § 1.192-1.196   Cited 20 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Requiring "a statement . . . that the claims of the group do not stand or fall together," and an explanation "why the claims of the group are believed to be separately patentable"

  14. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)