Ex Parte Kallinen

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 2, 2016

13137262 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 2, 2016)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/137,262 08/02/2011 Risto Kallinen SCS-5065-125 4954
23117 7590 12/06/2016
NIXON & VANDERHYE, PC
901 NORTH GLEBE ROAD, 11TH FLOOR
ARLINGTON, VA 22203
EXAMINER
SCHATZ, CHRISTOPHER T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1746
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/06/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PTOMAIL@nixonvan.com
pair_nixon @ firsttofile. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte RISTO KALLINEN
Appeal 2014-009938
Application 13/137,262
Technology Center 1700
Before CATHERINE Q. TIMM, BEVERLY A. FRANKLIN, and
ELIZABETH M. ROESEL, Administrative Patent Judges.
ROESEL, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 1—4, 12, and 14. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).2
We AFFIRM.
1 Airbus Operations Limited is identified as the real party in interest. App.
Br. 4.
2 In our opinion below, we reference the Specification filed August 2, 2011
(Spec.), Final Office Action mailed June 4, 2013 (Final Action), the Appeal
Brief filed February 24, 2014 (Appeal Br.), the Examiner’s Answer mailed
July 11, 2014 (Ans.), and the Reply Brief filed September 9, 2014 (Reply
Br.).
Appeal 2014-009938
Application 13/137,262
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claimed Invention
Appellant claims a method of manufacturing a composite laminate
panel. App. Br. 22, 23 (claims 1 and 14). Such panels may be used to form
the wing, empennage, or fuselage of an aircraft. Spec. 1:8—18.
Claim 1 is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal and is
reproduced below from Appellant’s Claims Appendix:
1. A method of manufacturing a composite panel, the
method comprising:
fitting a control member through the panel;
fitting a plug through a compaction tool;
controlling thickness of said compacted panel by
engaging the control member with the plug;
engaging the plug with a datum surface of the
compaction tool;
compacting the panel with the compaction tool; and
disengaging the plug from the control member after the
panel has been compacted.
App. Br. 22.
Perko
Marshall
Phillips
Rajabali
References
US 4,875,966
US 5,141,690
US 6,644,641 B2
WO 03/011594 A1
Oct. 24, 1989
Aug. 25, 1992
Nov. 11,2003
Feb. 13, 2003
Rejections
The Examiner maintains the following rejections:3
3 A rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph is withdrawn. Ans. 2.
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Application 13/137,262
1. Claims 1, 3, 4, and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Perko in view of Marshall. Final Action 3—5.
2. Claims 1, 2, and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Rajabali in view of Phillips and Marshall. Final Action 5—6.
ANALYSIS
Appellant presents the same arguments against each ground of
rejection and does not argue any claim separately from the others. See App.
Br. 11—20. We select claim 1 as representative for deciding the issues raised
by Appellant’s arguments. These issues are: (1) whether the Examiner errs
in finding that Marshall teaches using a control member to control the
thickness of a composite; and (2) whether the Examiner’s reason for
combining Marshall with the other cited references is merely conclusory.
We address each of these issues below.
Marshall
The Examiner finds that Marshall discloses a method of making a
composite, wherein a control member 3 is used to define the thickness of the
composite. Final Action 3 (citing Marshall 4:1—39, Figs. 1, 2). The
Examiner additionally finds that the control member 3 controls the thickness
because the thickness of the panel cannot be any greater than the length of
the control member 3. Id. at 3^4.
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s findings are erroneous because
the thickness of Marshall’s composite will vary as a function of the
compressibility of a rubber sheet and nylon film located between the mold
parts. App. Br. 12. According to Appellant, Marshall’s needles 3 (which
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Application 13/137,262
the Examiner identifies as a control member) do not define the thickness of
the composite. Id.
We are not persuaded that Appellant identifies error in the Examiner’s
findings. We agree with the Examiner that, regardless of the compressibility
of Marshall’s rubber sheet and nylon film, the thickness of Marshall’s
composite cannot be greater than the length of needles (control members) 3.
Final Action 3; Ans. 2—3. The Examiner’s finding is supported by
Marshall’s disclosure of a first embodiment, as shown in Figures 1 and 2,
and a second embodiment, as shown in Figure 3. Both embodiments have a
plurality of needles 3 extending from mold part 1 toward mold parts 7 and 2.
Marshall 1:61—62, 2:35—49, 4:1—7. In the first embodiment, nylon film 11
and rubber sheet 12 are laid over needles 3, and the needles press against the
resilient material to form indentations. Id. at 2:40-43, 4:12—14, 4:65—68,
Figs. 1,2. In the second embodiment, mold part 7 has indentations designed
to cooperate with the needles 3. Id. at 2:38^40, 4:32—39, Fig. 3. In both
embodiments, fibers are laid in the mold around needles 3, and resin is
injected in the mold under vacuum and then cured. Id. at 4:1—20. These
disclosures support the Examiner’s finding that the length of Marshall’s
needles 3 set an upper limit on the thickness of the composite. Ans. 2—3.
We also agree that setting such an upper limit is sufficient to teach
“controlling thickness,” as recited in claim 1. Id.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues that “if the mold parts are not
fully together, the gap will be greater than the length of the needles and
therefore the thickness of the resultant composite will be greater than
desired.” Reply Br. 3. Appellant’s argument poses a hypothetical situation
that is not consistent with Marshall. Marshall teaches that the mold parts are
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Application 13/137,262
pressed together such that the needles either form indentations in the
resilient material (nylon film 11 and rubber sheet 12) or cooperate with
indentations in mold part 7. Marshall 2:38-43, 4:12—14, 4:32—39, 4:65—68,
Figs. 1—3. Accordingly, the Examiner is correct that the thickness of the
molded composite cannot be greater than the needles, which form
perforations passing entirely through the composite. Id. at 2:35—38.
Appellant additionally argues that, if Marshall’s mold parts 2 and 7
are “extended downwardly more than they should be,” then the needles
(control members) 3 will be pushed into the resilient material (nylon film 11
and rubber sheet 12), “making the composite part thinner than is desired.”
Reply Br. 3. Similarly, Appellant argues that, in Marshall, the space
between the mold parts will vary because the needles contact the
compressible nylon and rubber sheets with varying amounts of force. Reply
Br. 6. Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s
finding that, in Marshall, the length of needles 3 sets an upper limit on the
thickness of the composite part. Ans. 2—3. At best, Appellant’s arguments
show that Marshall’s composite may be thinner than the length of needles 3,
which does not identify error in the Examiner’s finding that Marshall teaches
using needles 3 as control members to control thickness. Final Action 3;
Ans. 2—3. Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive for the additional
reason that they fail to address Marshall’s alternative embodiment having
indentations in mold part 7 in lieu of rubber sheet 12. Marshall 2:38-40,
4:32-39, Fig. 3.
Reason to Combine
The Examiner finds that Perko teaches all elements of claim 1, except
that Perko does not disclose that the control member controls the thickness
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Application 13/137,262
of the panel. Final Action 3. The Examiner concludes that it would have
been obvious to modify Perko such that the control member controls the
thickness of the panel, as taught by Marshall. Id. at 4. As a rationale, the
Examiner states that this modification would enable one to form a panel of a
desired thickness. Id.
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s statement is merely conclusory
and has nothing to do with reasons why one of ordinary skill in the art would
pick and choose features from the cited art and combine them in the manner
of claim 1. App. Br. 15.
We are not persuaded that Appellant’s argument identifies reversible
error in the Examiner’s rejection. Although Appellant labels the Examiner’s
reasoning as “merely conclusory,” the same can be said for Appellant’s
argument. Appellant does not challenge the substance of the Examiner’s
reasoning, namely that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
desired to form a panel of a prescribed thickness. Nor does Appellant
contest that such a desire is applicable to a method of manufacturing a
composite panel, as disclosed by Perko. To the extent that Appellant
elaborates or explains its position, it relies on the same argument addressed
above, namely that Marshall does not disclose a control member that
controls the thickness of the panel. App. Br. 15; Reply Br. 7—8. We are not
persuaded by this argument for the reasons discussed above.
CONCLUSION OF LAW AND DECISION
We are not persuaded that Appellant identifies reversible error in the
Examiner’s rejections. In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“[Ejven assuming that the examiner had failed to make a prima facie case,
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Application 13/137,262
the Board would not have erred in framing the issue as one of ‘reversible
error.’”).
The decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 1—4, 12, and 14 is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) (1).
AFFIRMED
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