Patent Appeal No. 77-509. October 13, 1977. Richard G. Miller, New York City, attorney of record, for appellants, James C. Arvantes, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, C.J., RICH, BALDWIN and LANE, JJ., and FORD, J., United States Customs Court. MARKEY, Chief Judge. Appeal from the decision of the Patent and Trademark
Nos. 79-1440, 79-1442. Argued October 29, 1979. Decided December 26, 1979. As Amended on Denial of Rehearing and Rehearing In Banc April 10, 1980. Anthony R. Chiara, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant. Seymour Rothstein, Albert W. Bicknell, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Before SWYGERT and WOOD, Circuit Judges, and ACKERMAN, District Judge. Judge J. Waldo Ackerman of the United States District Court
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) In the course of examining or treating a matter in a pending or abandoned application, in a patent, or in a reexamination proceeding, including a reexamination proceeding ordered as a result of a supplemental examination proceeding, the examiner or other Office employee may require the submission, from individuals identified under § 1.56(c) , or any assignee, of such information as may be reasonably necessary to properly examine or treat the matter, for example: (i)Commercial databases: The
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)