§
Ex Parte Jager

10 Cited authorities

  1. Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co.

    441 F.3d 945 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 339 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding a patent claim construction that reads limitations out of a claim is "contrary to the principle that claim language should not [be] treated as meaningless"

  2. Stumbo v. Eastman Outdoors

    508 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 63 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that an expert's statement "in conclusory fashion" that two methods were not "significantly different" is the type of "cursory conclusion" that "will not withstand summary judgment."

  3. In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc.

    696 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 41 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the conclusion that the claimed electrochemical sensor could not have external wires was supported by, among other considerations, the fact that "every embodiment disclosed in the specification shows . . . sensor without external cables or wires"

  4. In re Gabapentin Patent

    503 F.3d 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 41 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Affirming district court's construction for the term "adjuvants" that contained a negative limitation explaining that the term "'[does not] refer to the ingredients of capsule shells or tablet coatings.'"

  5. In re Van Geuns

    988 F.2d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 21 times   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 91-1088. March 10, 1993. Jack E. Haken, U.S. Philips Corp., Tarrytown, NY, argued, for appellant. Fred E. McKelvey, Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, VA, argued, for appellee. With him on the brief, was Lee E. Barrett, Associate Sol. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Before ARCHER, PLAGER, and RADER, Circuit Judges. ARCHER, Circuit Judge. Johannes R. Van Geuns appeals from the September 25, 1990 decision of the Patent and Trademark Office

  6. Foremost v. Cold Chain

    485 F.3d 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 2006-1582. May 2, 2007. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, James V. Selna, J. James C. Brooks, Attorney, Orrick, Herrington Sutcliffe LLP, of Los Angeles, CA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief were Hope E. Melville and Mark J. Shean, of Irvine, CA. Edward R. Schwartz, Attorney, Christie, Parker Hale, LLP, of Pasadena, CA, argued for defendant-appellee. Before NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, FRIEDMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and PROST

  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,173 times   493 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  8. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 189 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  9. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 99 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  10. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)