Patent Appeal No. 76-681. Decided August 18, 1977. Arthur H. Seidel, Thomas W. Ehrmann, Milwaukee, Wis. (Quarles Brady, Milwaukee, Wis.), attorneys of record, for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, R.D. Edmonds, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, BALDWIN and MILLER, Judges, and HERBERT N. MALETZ, Judge, United States Customs Court. BALDWIN, Judge. This is an appeal
Patent Appeal No. 77-509. October 13, 1977. Richard G. Miller, New York City, attorney of record, for appellants, James C. Arvantes, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, C.J., RICH, BALDWIN and LANE, JJ., and FORD, J., United States Customs Court. MARKEY, Chief Judge. Appeal from the decision of the Patent and Trademark
FEBRUARY TERM, 1794. For the Appellants, the case was briefly opened, upon the following principles. The question is of great importance; and extends to the whole judicial authority of the United States; for, if the admiralty has no jurisdiction, there can be no jurisdiction in any common law court. Nor is it material to distinguish the ownership of the vessel and cargo; since strangers, or aliens, in amity, are entitled equally with Americans to have their property protected by the laws. Vatt. B
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)