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Ex Parte Huff

10 Cited authorities

  1. In re Zletz

    893 F.2d 319 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 42 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that claims failing this test during prosecution must be rejected under § 112, ¶ 2

  2. Application of Prater

    415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969)   Cited 78 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation during examination "since the applicant may then amend his claims"

  3. In re Sneed

    710 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 21 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Rejecting argument that a prior art reference should not be considered "because it deals with collapsible hose rather than flexible plastic pipe and teaches that rolling 600 feet of 4 inch, noncollapsible hose into a transportable bundle is virtually 'an insurmountable task'" because "it is not necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable to render obvious the invention under review."

  4. Application of Burckel

    592 F.2d 1175 (C.C.P.A. 1979)   Cited 14 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Appeal No. 78-616. March 1, 1979. C. Wayne Stephens, Wilmington, Del., for appellant; Hoge T. Sutherland, Los Angeles, Cal., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for Commissioner of Patents; Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Appeals (board) affirming

  5. Application of Okuzawa

    537 F.2d 545 (C.C.P.A. 1976)   Cited 5 times

    Patent Appeal No. 76-561. July 22, 1976. Charles L. Gholz, Sughrue, Rothwell, Mion, Zinn Macpeak, Washington, D.C., attorney of record, for appellant. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, John W. Dewhirst, Joseph T. Zatarga, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeal. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, RICH, LANE and MILLER, Judges, and ALMOND, Senior Judge. MILLER, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and

  6. In re Herz

    537 F.2d 549 (C.C.P.A. 1976)   Cited 5 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Noting that the transitional phrase "consisting essentially of" permits some additional elements, but excludes additional unspecified materials or steps that would "materially affect the basic and novel characteristic" of the claimed invention

  7. Application of Herbert

    461 F.2d 1390 (C.C.P.A. 1972)   Cited 3 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8664. June 29, 1972. Jacobs Jacobs, New York City, attorneys of record, for appellant; Albert L. Jacobs, Jr., New York City, of counsel. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner for Patents; Fred E. McKelvey, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN, and LANE, Judges, and MALETZ, Judge, United States Customs Court, sitting by designation. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,172 times   492 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 1.192-1.196 - Reserved

    37 C.F.R. § 1.192-1.196   Cited 20 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Requiring "a statement . . . that the claims of the group do not stand or fall together," and an explanation "why the claims of the group are believed to be separately patentable"

  10. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)