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Ex parte HSU et al.

07968736 (B.P.A.I. Jun. 17, 1998)
Ex parte HSU et al.

19 Cited authorities

  1. In re Yamamoto

    740 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 110 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Giving claims their broadest reasonable interpretation “serves the public interest by reducing the possibility that claims, finally allowed, will be given broader scope than is justified”

  2. In re Oetiker

    977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 66 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Reversing for "improperly combined" references, because "[i]f examination at the initial stage does not produce a prima facie case of unpatentability, then without more the applicant is entitled to grant of the patent"

  3. In re Piasecki

    745 F.2d 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 73 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding nonobviousness where the evidence demonstrated a failure of others to provide a feasible solution to a longstanding problem

  4. In re Zletz

    893 F.2d 319 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 42 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that claims failing this test during prosecution must be rejected under § 112, ¶ 2

  5. Application of Prater

    415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969)   Cited 78 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation during examination "since the applicant may then amend his claims"

  6. In re Thorpe

    777 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 40 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that prior art pertinent only to product is proper ground for rejecting product-by-process claims

  7. In re Marosi

    710 F.2d 799 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 36 times
    Holding claim limitations "are to be interpreted in light of the specification in giving them their 'broadest reasonable interpretation.'"

  8. In re Pearson

    494 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 28 times
    Affirming § 103 rejection when § 102 rejection would also have been appropriate

  9. Johnson Johnson v. W.L. Gore Assoc.

    436 F. Supp. 704 (D. Del. 1977)   Cited 20 times
    In Johnson Johnson v. W.L. Gore Associates, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 704 (D.Del. 1977), the court rejected a laches defense despite some indication the alleged infringement had been occurring for many years prior to the institution of suit.

  10. Application of Warner

    379 F.2d 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1967)   Cited 22 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 7822. June 29, 1967. Richard E. Warner, for appellants. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (Jere W. Sears, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, RICH, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges, and WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. Senior District Judge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. SMITH, Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Appeals affirming the examiner's rejection of the appealed claims under 35 U

  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,129 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  12. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  13. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)