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Ex Parte Hori et al

10600571 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 5, 2013)
Ex Parte Hori et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,523 times   180 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. In re Kahn

    441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 142 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the motivation-suggestion-teaching test, much like the analogous-art test, is used to defend against hindsight

  3. In re Schreiber

    128 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 148 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that once the Examiner established a prima facie case of anticipation, the burden of proof was properly shifted to the inventor to rebut the finding of inherency

  4. In re Dillon

    919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 69 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Finding a prima facie case of obviousness where the prior art tri-orthoester compound was found to be equivalent to the claimed tetra-orthoester compound and the use of the tri-orthoester as a fuel additive was expected to produce essentially the same result as the use of the tetra-orthoester

  5. In re Keller

    642 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 43 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating "[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference"

  6. In re Gordon

    733 F.2d 900 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 31 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding that a modification which renders the invention inoperable for its intended purpose is not obvious because it teaches away from the invention

  7. In re Berg

    320 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 10 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Nos. 02-1120, 02-1160. DECIDED: February 20, 2003. Richard Aron Osman, Science Technology Law Group, of Hillsborough, CA, argued for appellant. Kristin L. Yohannan, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Arlington, VA, argued for appellee. With her on the brief were John M. Whealan, Solicitor; and Linda Moncys Isacson, Associate Solicitor. Before BRYSON, Circuit Judge, PLAGER, Senior Circuit Judge, and PROST, Circuit Judge. BRYSON, Circuit Judge. Appellants Richard A.

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,063 times   460 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 182 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well

  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)