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Ex Parte Hopkins et al

13672300 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 14, 2018)
Ex Parte Hopkins et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,523 times   180 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. In re Kahn

    441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 142 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the motivation-suggestion-teaching test, much like the analogous-art test, is used to defend against hindsight

  3. Winner Intern. Royalty Corp. v. Wang

    202 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 152 times
    Holding that "the admission of live testimony on all matters before the Board in a section 146 action, as in this case, makes a factfinder of the district court and requires a de novo trial"

  4. Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA Sports, Inc.

    392 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 132 times   12 Legal Analyses
    Noting that licenses "may constitute evidence of nonobviousness; however, only little weight can be attributed to such evidence if the patentee does not demonstrate a nexus between the merits of the invention and the licenses of record" (quoting In re GPAC Inc. , 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995) )

  5. In re Clay

    966 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 87 times   10 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that a reference was not reasonably pertinent where a PHOSITA "would not reasonably have expected to solve the [relevant] problem ... by considering" that reference

  6. In re Geisler

    116 F.3d 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 52 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Finding a 26 percent improvement in wear resistance insufficient to constitute proof of "substantially improved results"

  7. Scientific Plastic Prods., Inc. v. Biotage Ab

    766 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   Cited 8 times

    Nos. 2013–1219 2013–1220 2013–1221. 2014-09-10 SCIENTIFIC PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., Appellant, v. BIOTAGE AB, Appellee. Frederick C. Laney, Niro, Haller & Niro, of Chicago, IL, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Paul K. Vickrey. Of counsel on the brief was David M. Quinlan, David M. Quinlan, P.C., of Princeton, NJ. George C. Beck, Foley & Lardner, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Michael R. Houston, of Chicago, IL, and Debra D. Nye, of San Diego,

  8. In re Keller

    642 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 43 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating "[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference"

  9. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,063 times   459 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  10. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 182 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  11. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)