Appeal No. 78-616. March 1, 1979. C. Wayne Stephens, Wilmington, Del., for appellant; Hoge T. Sutherland, Los Angeles, Cal., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for Commissioner of Patents; Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Appeals (board) affirming
Appeal No. 85-781. July 26, 1985. James W. Geriak, Lyon Lyon, of Los Angeles, Cal., argued, for appellants. With him on brief were Roy L. Anderson and William E. Mouzavires, Lyon Lyon, Washington, D.C. Fred W. Sherling, Associate Solicitor, U.S. Patent Trademark Office, Arlington, Va., argued, for appellee. With him on brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol. and Fred E. McKelvey, Deputy Sol., Washington, D.C. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before RICH, Circuit
Patent Appeal No. 76-610. December 9, 1976. Kenneth F. Dusyn, atty. of record, for appellants; Melvin H. Kurtz and M. Ted Raptes, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. MILLER, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board
Patent Appeal No. 6156. January 20, 1956. Rehearing Denied March 29, 1956. Henry Shur, Washington, D.C., for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (H.S. Miller, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before O'CONNELL, Acting Chief Judge, and JOHNSON, WORLEY, COLE, and JACKSON (retired), Judges. COLE, Judge. This case involves the patentability of certain claims of an application (Serial No. 109,130, filed August 8, 1949) directed to a "combination screen and storm
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)