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Ex Parte Hood et al

11450159 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2013)
Ex Parte Hood et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,519 times   169 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. Perricone v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp.

    432 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 147 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a prior-art reference anticipated claims 1-4 and 7, but not claims 8, 9, and 13, because the latter set of claims contained one fewer limitation

  3. In re Antor Media Corp.

    689 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 32 times   4 Legal Analyses

    No. 2011–1465. Reexamination Nos. 90/007,839 90/007,936 90/007,942 90/007,957 90/009,261. 2012-07-27 In re ANTOR MEDIA CORPORATION. Thomas A. Lewry, Brooks Kushman, P.C., of Southfield, Michigan, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Thomas W. Cunningham. William Lamarca, Associate Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia. With him on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Robert J. McManus, Associate Solicitor. LOURIE

  4. In re Fritch

    972 F.2d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 30 times
    Stating "dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious"

  5. IN RE FOUT

    675 F.2d 297 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 24 times
    Holding preamble of Jepson-type claim to be admitted prior art where applicant's specification credited another as the inventor of the subject matter of the preamble

  6. Application of Best

    562 F.2d 1252 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 18 times   4 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 77-509. October 13, 1977. Richard G. Miller, New York City, attorney of record, for appellants, James C. Arvantes, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, C.J., RICH, BALDWIN and LANE, JJ., and FORD, J., United States Customs Court. MARKEY, Chief Judge. Appeal from the decision of the Patent and Trademark

  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,056 times   447 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  8. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,938 times   944 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 182 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)