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Ex Parte Holmes

15 Cited authorities

  1. Net Moneyin v. Verisign

    545 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008)   Cited 284 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, to anticipate, a single prior art reference must not only disclose all the limitations claimed but also must disclose those limitations "arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim"

  2. Verdegaal Bros., v. Union Oil Co. of Calif

    814 F.2d 628 (Fed. Cir. 1987)   Cited 138 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding reliance on non-claimed distinction between prior art method and claimed method "inappropriate" and insufficient to save the claim from inherent anticipation

  3. In re Wright

    999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 91 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Relying on art published five years after filing date to show what was "sufficiently unpredictable" as of filing date

  4. In re Kaslow

    707 F.2d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 75 times
    Holding that prior demonstration of computerized supermarket UPC code system was prior use under meaning of Section 102(b)

  5. In re Alton

    76 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1996)   Cited 49 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that when the examiner alleges that the claimed embodiment is outside the scope of the specification, he "need only establish this fact to make out a prima facie case"

  6. In re Youman

    679 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 17 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Explaining that section 251's “error” requirement covers “inadvertence or mistake,” not “deliberate” choices made by the patentee

  7. In re Mostafazadeh

    643 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 15 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Applying step three's “materially narrowing” analysis “relative to the original claims” where “original claims” are defined as “the claims before surrender”

  8. Application of Edwards

    568 F.2d 1349 (C.C.P.A. 1978)   Cited 17 times

    Appeal No. 77-532. January 12, 1978. As Amended January 18, 1978. James L. Bailey, Houston, Tex., attorney of record, for appellants. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, Fred W. Sherling, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. LANE, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Appeals (board) affirming the final

  9. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,423 times   1070 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it

  10. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 6,034 times   1029 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  11. Section 251 - Reissue of defective patents

    35 U.S.C. § 251   Cited 467 times   74 Legal Analyses
    Describing the reissue of defective patents

  12. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 189 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  13. Section 6-A:6 - Sale of Bonds

    N.H. Rev. Stat. § 6-A:6   Cited 14 times

    Bonds issued hereunder shall be sold by the state treasurer with the approval of the governor and council in such manner as the governor and council deem to be most advantageous to the state. RSA 6-A:6 1967, 88:1. 1971, 353:3, eff. Aug. 24, 1971.

  14. Section 1.175 - Inventor's oath or declaration for a reissue application

    37 C.F.R. § 1.175   Cited 83 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Describing the reissue oath or declaration requirement

  15. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)