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Ex Parte Hirst

16 Cited authorities

  1. Wied v. Valhi, Inc.

    465 U.S. 1026 (1984)   Cited 260 times
    Stating that "[t]o demand a slavish adherence to the procedural sequence and to require these defendants, in this case, to articulate the words of renewal once the motion had been taken under advisement, would be 'to succumb to a nominalism and a rigid trial scenario as equally at variance as ambush with the spirit of the rules.'"

  2. Scripps Clinic Research Fdn. v. Genentech

    927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991)   Cited 452 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Holding that such claims are not limited by the process

  3. In re Paulsen

    30 F.3d 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 232 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding an inventor may define specific terms used to describe invention, but must do so "with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision" and, if done, must "'set out his uncommon definition in some manner within the patent disclosure' so as to give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change" in meaning

  4. Jones v. Hardy

    727 F.2d 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 122 times
    In Jones, this court reversed the district court's conclusion of obviousness because probative facts were not in dispute, no credibility determinations needed to be made, and the litigation had been going on for ten years.

  5. In re Clay

    966 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 88 times   10 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that a reference was not reasonably pertinent where a PHOSITA "would not reasonably have expected to solve the [relevant] problem ... by considering" that reference

  6. Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co.

    242 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001)   Cited 66 times
    Finding that preamble term limited claim because the term was used in the specification as well as in all of the claims

  7. Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.

    713 F.2d 760 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 111 times
    In Kalman, this court determined that the district court's fact finding of identity of invention (reached after a four day bench trial) was not clearly erroneous, and that "the stipulation by the parties, coupled with [Kimberly Clark's] failure to counter Kalman's affidavits and evidence submitted in his motion for summary judgment" dictated a finding of infringement.

  8. Application of Wood

    599 F.2d 1032 (C.C.P.A. 1979)   Cited 56 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding that reference in the patent's specification to a field of art encompassing the alleged prior art supported a finding that the alleged prior art was within the inventor's field of endeavor.

  9. In re Deminski

    796 F.2d 436 (Fed. Cir. 1986)   Cited 28 times
    Finding that if a prior art reference discloses essentially the same structure and function as the invention, it is likely in the same field of endeavor

  10. In re Fracalossi

    681 F.2d 792 (C.C.P.A. 1982)   Cited 21 times
    Addressing whether specific anticipation rejection was sufficient evidentiary support for obviousness rejection

  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,173 times   493 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  12. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 6,034 times   1028 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  13. Section 1.192-1.196 - Reserved

    37 C.F.R. § 1.192-1.196   Cited 20 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Requiring "a statement . . . that the claims of the group do not stand or fall together," and an explanation "why the claims of the group are believed to be separately patentable"

  14. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)