Ex Parte Hickman

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 19, 2017

14075646 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 19, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/075,646 11/08/2013 Mark R. Hickman H-13-148-US 6160
71016 7590
Bose Corporation
Patent Group
Mountain Road, MS 3B1
Framingham, MA 01701
06/21/2017 EXAMINER
PATEL, PREMAL R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2623
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/21/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket @ bose. com
designs @ bose. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MARK R. HICKMAN
Appeal 2017-0011901
Application 14/075,646
Technology Center 2600
Before JEAN R. HOMERE, DEBRA K. STEPHENS, and
JOHN A. EVANS, Administrative Patent Judges.
Per Curiam.
DECISION ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In papers filed May 15, 2017, Appellant requests a Rehearing under
37 C.F.R. § 41.52 from the Decision on Appeal (“Decision” or “Dec.”) of
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board), mailed May 1, 2017. In the
Decision, we affirmed the Examiner’s prior art rejections of claims 1—8, 10—
14, 17—22, 25, and 26 based on the combination of Wells and Ostergard
alone and in combination with other references. Dec. 7.
1 Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Bose Corporation. App.
Br. 2.
Appeal 2017-001190
Application 14/075,646
ANALYSIS
In the Request for Rehearing (“Req. Reh’g”), Appellant presented two
principal arguments. Req. Reh’g 2-4. We address Appellant’s arguments
seriatim.
First, Appellant argues the virtual three dimensional image taught in
Wells requires both display screens to display an image. Req. Reh’g 2
(citing Wells 113). In particular, Appellant contends Wells teaches a first
virtual three dimensional image displayed on the first display screen while a
second virtual three dimensional image is displayed on the second display
screen. Req. Reh’g 2 (citing Wells 113). According to Appellant, this
arrangement is required to form a multi-dimensional image. Req. Reh’g 2.
This argument is not persuasive.
We addressed the merits of this argument in the Decision by
explaining Wells teaches each display screen can display a virtual image.
Dec. 5. Contrary to Appellant’s argument, Wells teaches each display
screen can display a virtual three dimensional image or no image. See Wells
116.
...images generated on each display screen can also be virtual
three dimensional images, as well as two dimensional images.
The gaming device can display such virtual three dimensional
images on one or more of the display screens. The gaming
device of the present invention can use these images to generate
any suitable combination of virtual and actual three dimensional
images. The gaming device of the present invention can also use
both of these types of three dimensional representations to
generate a single three-dimensional image.
Wells 116 (Emphasis added).
In other words, Wells teaches the gaming device can display virtual
three dimensional images on one display screen while displaying none in the
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Application 14/075,646
other display screen(s). Wells 116. Thus, Wells does not require both
display screens to display virtual three dimensional images. See Wells H
13, 16. We, therefore, reiterate our conclusion that Wells teaches or
suggests one display screen can display virtual three dimensional images
while the other display screen displays no information. Dec. 5.
Second, Appellant argues the flashing of a translucent image on one
display taught in Wells does not suggest a distinct mode of operation in
which one panel displays information, while another display panel does not
display any information. Req. Reh’g 3^4. In particular, Appellant contends
intermittent instances when the second display is off does not teach the
recited separate mode of operation. Req. Reh’g 3. According to Appellant,
Wells teaches a single mode of operation with the first display screen
displaying a first image and a second display screen flashing a second
image. Req. Reh’g 3 (citing Wells 118). This argument was raised for the
first time in the Request for Rehearing and is deemed waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.52(a)(1) (“Arguments not raised, and Evidence not previously relied
upon, pursuant to §§ 41.37, 41.41, or 41.47 are not permitted in the request
for rehearing except as permitted by paragraphs (a)(2) through (a)(4) of this
section”).
Appellant furthermore reiterates arguments regarding rendering Wells
unsatisfactory for its intended purpose and frustrating the principle of
operation of Wells. Req. Reh’g 4. These arguments were fully addressed in
the Decision. Dec. 6.
Appellant is reminded that a request for rehearing is not an
opportunity for Appellant to reiterate arguments presented in the Briefs that
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Application 14/075,646
were fully addressed in the Decision. 37 C.F.R. § 41.52(f). Accordingly, we
find no error in our affirmance of these rejections.
DECISION
THEREFORE, we have granted Appellant’s Request to the extent that
we have reconsidered the original Decision, but have DENIED it with
respect to making any changes to the Decision.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
DENIED
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