§

Ex Parte Herrera et al

11127836 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 27, 2012)
Ex Parte Herrera et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc.

    438 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 226 times
    Holding that "the claim differentiation tool works best in the relationship between independent and dependent claims"

  2. Karlin Tech. v. Surgical Dynamics, Inc.

    177 F.3d 968 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 227 times
    Holding it improper to read the limitation in the dependent claims "into the independent claim from which they depend"

  3. Nazomi Communications, Inc. v. Arm Holdings, PLC

    403 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 190 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a claim may “embrac[e] different subject matter than is illustrated in the specific embodiments in the specification”

  4. Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Marchon Eyewear, Inc.

    672 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 144 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Holding that an independent claim including the limitation "magnetic member" includes ferromagnetic material in addition to a magnet, in light of dependent claim limiting "magnetic member" to a magnet

  5. E-Pass Technologies, Inc. v. 3Com Corp.

    343 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003)   Cited 126 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the "court's task is not to limit claim language to exclude particular devices because they do no serve a perceived 'purpose' of the invention. Rather, the district court's function is to interpret claims according to their plain language unless the patentee has chosen to be his own lexicographer in the specification or has clearly disclaimed coverage during prosecution. An invention may possess a number of advantages or purposes, and there is no requirement that every claim directed to that invention be limited to encompass all of them."

  6. In re Zletz

    893 F.2d 319 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 42 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that claims failing this test during prosecution must be rejected under § 112, ¶ 2

  7. Application of Venezia

    530 F.2d 956 (C.C.P.A. 1976)   Cited 4 times

    Patent Appeal No. 75-601. March 11, 1976. Donald R. Dunner, Lane, Aitken, Dunner Ziems, Washington, D.C., atty. of record, for appellant; S. Michael Bender, Richard A. Craig, New York City, Arthur Jacob, Hackensack, N. Y., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Thomas E. Lynch, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. LANE, Judge. This

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,055 times   447 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 182 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)