Ex Parte Hashimoto

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 20, 2017

12326991 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/326,991 12/03/2008 Hirokazu Hashimoto 335633US8 4437
22850 7590 03/22/2017
OBLON, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P.
1940 DUKE STREET
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314
EXAMINER
SITTA, GRANT
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2622
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/22/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patentdocket @ oblon. com
oblonpat @ oblon. com
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte HIROKAZU HASHIMOTO
Appeal 2015-005070
Application 12/326,991
Technology Center 2600
Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, and
BETH Z. SHAW, Administrative Patent Judges.
SHAW, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1, 4, 5, 8, and 11—15, which are the only claims currently
pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
INVENTION
The invention is for a touch detection method of an information
processing device. Spec. p. 1,11. 8—10.
Appeal 2015-005070
Application 12/326,991
Claim 1, which is illustrative, reads as follows, with disputed
limitations emphasized:
1. An information processing device comprising:
circuitry configured to calculate a movement amount of a touch
operation based on a touch point at which the touch operation is
performed with respect to a touch panel and a touch release point at
which the touch operation is released from the touch panel;
determine that the touch operation is a depression operation or a
gesture operation;
control a display having the touch panel on its front surface to
switch from displaying first content to displaying second content when
it is determined that the touch input is the depression operation to a
button displayed on the display and to switch from displaying the first
content to displaying the second content when it is determined that the
touch input is the gesture operation and the button is displayed on the
display.
REJECTIONS AT ISSUE
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 4, 5, and 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Tomkins (US 2009/0102806 Al, published Apr. 23,
2009) in view of Lemay et al. (US 2008/0201650 Al, published Aug. 21,
2008) (“Lemay”). Final Act. 2-4.
The Examiner rejected claims 11—15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Tomkins, Lemay, and Sutanto et al. (US 2008/0184173
Al, published July 31, 2008) (“Sutanto”). Final Act. 5—8.
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejections are in error. Br. 6—11.
We have reviewed Appellant’s arguments in the Brief, the Examiner’s
rejection, and the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s arguments. We adopt
as our own the findings and reasons set forth in the rejection from which this
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Application 12/326,991
appeal is taken and in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s
Appeal Brief. See Ans. 2—9; Final Act. 2—8.
Appellant argues that Lemay does not teach or suggest “a depression
operation to a button displayed on the display and a gesture operation and
the button is displayed on the display.” Br. 7. First, we note that claim 1
requires:
control a display having the touch panel on its front
surface to switch from displaying first content to displaying
second content when it is determined that the touch input is the
depression operation to a button displayed on the display and to
switch from displaying the first content to displaying the second
content when it is determined that the touch input is the gesture
operation and the button is displayed on the display.
Appellant argues that Femay’s gesture 3965 is received on the right
side of the displayed widget and is not received at a button displayed on the
display. Br. 8. Moreover, Appellant argues, the web-clip widget does not
include any displayed button that allows the user to switch between web-clip
widgets. Id. Appellant argues the user interface of Femay only allows the
user to switch between web-clip widgets according to the region on the
displayed web-clip widget that is touched by a user. Id. Thus, Appellant
argues, Femay does not teach displaying a button. Id.
The Examiner maps the recited “button is displayed on the display” to
the user-created widget 2 of Femay. Ans. 2-4. The Examiner interprets the
widget as a button. Id. at 3. The Examiner explains that the widget is a
graphical user interface “that displays a multi-direction button which is
outlined that can be clicked to select an option.” Ans. 3.
We agree with the Examiner’s finding that Femay’s teaching of the
widget 2 teaches the recited “button is displayed on the display” because
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Application 12/326,991
Appellant provides insufficient evidence proving that the claims limit
“button,” in a way that, under a broad but reasonable interpretation, is not
encompassed by Lemay’s teachings. “[T]he PTO gives claims their
‘broadest reasonable interpretation.’” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1324,
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
“Moreover, limitations are not to be read into the claims from the
specification.” In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184, (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(citing In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). Although Appellant
argues, without support, that Lemay’s widget is not a “button” as claimed,
we are not persuaded that the claims, as drafted, are so narrow. Thus, we are
not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that Lemay fails to teach this
limitation.
Appellant also generally argues that touching Lemay’s icons 3902 or
3906 in Figure 5m merely results in switching between previous and next
web pages, and not switching between web-clip widgets, and therefore
selecting those icons/buttons does not result in displaying the same content
as receiving the swipe operation. Br. 9. However, the Examiner does not
rely on icons 3902 or 3906 alone as the claimed button, but rather interprets
the outline of the user-created widget 2, shown in Figure 5m of Lemay, as
the claimed button. Ans. 4. As the Examiner explains, Tomkins teaches
distinguishing between gesture and object selection (Ans. 6), which
Appellant does not appear to dispute. The Examiner relies on Lemay to
specifically teach displaying content and content management. Id. at 7.
Lemay describes how in response to detecting a gesture on the touch screen
display, display of the web-clip widget ceases and another web-clip widget
is displayed. Id. (citing Lemay 1204). The Examiner explains that Tomkins
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Application 12/326,991
discloses movie based clips and controls. Ans. 8 (citing Tomkins 120). For
example, button 220 from Fig. 4 of Tomkins can be seen a fast forward to
the next movie clip. Id. Therefore, a tap within button 220 would jump to
the next movie clip. Id. Similarly, a gesture performed within area 220 that
does not meet the threshold would also jump to the same next movie clip.
Id. The Examiner explains that “[ajrguably, Tomkins provides all the
teachings however, in order to advance prosecution Lemay was brought in to
expressly teach using either a tap or gesture to arrive at the same second
content.” Id. We agree with the Examiner that Tomkins as modified by
Lemay teaches (i) determining whether an input is a depression operation or
a gesture operation (Tomkins) and (ii) switching content according to a
gesture operation or a detected depression operation to arrive at the second
content (Lemay). Ans. 9.
Appellant argues that Lemay’s gesture 3965 is not received “at” a
button displayed on the display. Br. 8. However, the claim does not recite
that the gesture must be received “at” the button.
For these reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and
of claim 5, which was argued together with claim 1.
Because Appellant has not presented separate patentability arguments
or has reiterated substantially the same arguments as those previously
discussed for patentability above (see Br. 2—11), the remaining pending
claims fall for the same reasons as claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1, 4, 5, 8, and 11—15 is
affirmed.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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