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Ex Parte Guzman

11 Cited authorities

  1. In re Paulsen

    30 F.3d 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 232 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding an inventor may define specific terms used to describe invention, but must do so "with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision" and, if done, must "'set out his uncommon definition in some manner within the patent disclosure' so as to give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change" in meaning

  2. In re Gleave

    560 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 149 times
    Finding that the prior art reference was enabling and stating that “the fact that [the reference] provides ‘no understanding of which of the targets would be useful’ is of no import, because [the patent applicant] admits that it is well within the skill of an ordinary person in the art to make any oligodeoxynucleotide sequence”

  3. Microsoft Corp. v. Biscotti, Inc.

    878 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2017)   Cited 23 times
    Determining that the Board applied the correct legal standard in not requiring "word-for-word similarity or perfection" and instead considering "whether a POSA would 'at once envisage' the combination of the claimed invention"

  4. In re Bond

    910 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 57 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding that, since "structural equivalency ... is a question of fact," where the Board made no finding as to structural equivalency, this Court would "not reach that question in the first instance" and instead vacate and remand

  5. Eli Lilly & Co. v. L. A. Biomedical Research Inst. at Harbor-UCLA Med. Ctr.

    849 F.3d 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2017)   Cited 2 times

    2016-1547 02-28-2017 ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, Appellant v. LOS ANGELES BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE AT HARBOR–UCLA MEDICAL CENTER, Appellee Mark J. Feldstein, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP, Washington, DC, argued for appellant. Also represented by Joshua Goldberg, Yieyie Yang ; Charles E. Lipsey, Reston, VA; Mark Stewart, Eli Lilly and Company, Indianapolis, IN. Ewa M. Davison, Fenwick & West LLP, Seattle, WA, argued for appellee. Also represented by David Keith Tellekson, Elizabeth

  6. Application of Preda

    401 F.2d 825 (C.C.P.A. 1968)   Cited 5 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 8016. October 24, 1968. Wenderoth, Lind Ponack, A. Ponak, Washington, D.C. (John T. Miller, Washington, D.C., of counsel) for appellant. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C. (Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel) for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge and RICH, SMITH, ALMOND, and BALDWIN, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the rejection of claims 7 and 8 of application serial No. 269,707

  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,065 times   461 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  8. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,945 times   960 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 183 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 41.50 - Decisions and other actions by the Board

    37 C.F.R. § 41.50   Cited 34 times   30 Legal Analyses
    Requiring petitioners to raise the Board's failure to designate a new ground of rejection in a timely request for rehearing

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)