No. 2011–1547. 2013-03-7 In re Jeffrey HUBBELL, Jason Schense, Andreas Zisch, and Heike Hall. Rivka D. Monheit, Pabst Patent Group LLP, of Atlanta, Georgia, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Patrea L. Pabst. Frances M. Lynch, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Amy J. Nelson, Associate Solicitor. O'MALLEY Rivka D. Monheit, Pabst Patent Group LLP, of Atlanta
Patent Appeal No. 7022. December 12, 1963. Joseph K. Andonian, Kalamazoo, Mich. (Eugene O. Retter, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Raymond E. Martin, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH and ALMOND, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the rejection of claims 1-13 of application serial No. 560,894, filed
Appeal No. 78-624. March 15, 1979. Terence P. Strobaugh, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellants. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. BALDWIN, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Appeals (board) affirming the rejection of claims 1 and 3-15
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)