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Ex Parte George et al

11564134 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 10, 2012)
Ex Parte George et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,519 times   169 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. United States v. Adams

    383 U.S. 39 (1966)   Cited 478 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Finding that one of ordinary skill in the art would have to ignore long-accepted factors in the field of wet batters to arrive at the claimed invention

  3. In re Kahn

    441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 141 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the motivation-suggestion-teaching test, much like the analogous-art test, is used to defend against hindsight

  4. Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp.

    554 F.3d 982 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 32 times
    Finding obviousness, not anticipation, where "two separate embodiments" of a reference taught all limitations and "one of ordinary in the art would been motivated to combine" them

  5. In re Suong–Hyu Hyon

    679 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012)   Cited 13 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Explaining that motivation to combine is an underlying factual issue that is reviewed for substantial evidence

  6. In re Constr. Equip. Co.

    665 F.3d 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 8 times

    No. 2010–1507.Reexamination No. 90/008,447. 2011-12-15 In re CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT COMPANY. Peter E. Heuser, Schwabe Williamson & Wyatt PC, of Portland, OR, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Devon Zastrow Newman. Frances M. Lynch, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, VA, argued for appellee. With her on the brief was Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Janet A. Gongola, Associate Solicitor. PROST Peter E. Heuser, Schwabe Williamson & Wyatt PC,

  7. Application of Danly

    263 F.2d 844 (C.C.P.A. 1959)   Cited 4 times
    Limiting claims to require that the claimed device actually be connected to an alternating current source because, although the claims "do not positively recite a source of alternating current as an element of the claims," any other interpretation would render certain language in the claims meaningless

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,055 times   447 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 182 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well

  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)