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Ex Parte Geel

19 Cited authorities

  1. Merck Co. v. Biocraft Laboratories, Inc.

    493 U.S. 975 (1989)   Cited 98 times
    Noting that Massachusetts has not adopted good faith doctrine of United States v. Leon

  2. In re Kahn

    441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 149 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the motivation-suggestion-teaching test, much like the analogous-art test, is used to defend against hindsight

  3. In re O'Farrell

    853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 168 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Finding patent obvious where the prior art provided a "reasonable expectation of success"

  4. Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Banner

    778 F.2d 775 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 131 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Holding that an earlier species disclosure in the prior art defeats any generic claim

  5. In re Gurley

    27 F.3d 551 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 102 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Upholding obviousness finding where patent was directed to one of two alternative resins disclosed in prior art reference, even though reference described claimed resin as "inferior."

  6. In re Huang

    100 F.3d 135 (Fed. Cir. 1996)   Cited 94 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the inventor's opinion as to the purchaser's reason for buying the product is insufficient to demonstrate a nexus

  7. In re Oetiker

    977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 66 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Reversing for "improperly combined" references, because "[i]f examination at the initial stage does not produce a prima facie case of unpatentability, then without more the applicant is entitled to grant of the patent"

  8. In re Woodruff

    919 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 58 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding a claimed invention obvious because claimed range (“more than 5% to about 25%” carbon monoxide) abutted range of prior art (“about 1–5%” carbon monoxide)

  9. Merck Co., Inc. v. Biocraft Laboratories

    874 F.2d 804 (Fed. Cir. 1989)   Cited 47 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the prior art's disclosure of a multitude of combinations failed to render any particular formulation less obvious

  10. In re Dance

    160 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1998)   Cited 19 times

    No. 97-1229. October 30, 1998. Grady J. Frenchick, Stroud, Stroud, Willink Thompson Howard, Madison, Wisconsin, argued for appellants Dance, et al. of counsel on the brief was Karen B. King. David J. Ball, Jr., Associate Solicitor, Office of Solicitor, Arlington, Virginia, argued for appellee, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks. With him on the brief were Nancy J. Linck, Solicitor, Albin F. Drost, Deputy Solicitor, and Scott A. Chambers, Associate Solicitor. Before MAYER, Chief Judge, NEWMAN

  11. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,418 times   1066 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it

  12. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,172 times   492 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  13. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well

  14. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)