Ex Parte Gauthier et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,519 times   169 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
  2. PPG Industries v. Guardian Industries Corp.

    156 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998)   Cited 199 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, for a claim reciting glass "consisting essentially of" certain materials, the district court properly "left it to the jury to determine whether the amounts of [an unclaimed ingredient had] a material effect on the basic and novel characteristics of the glass"
  3. In re Gurley

    27 F.3d 551 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 100 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Upholding obviousness finding where patent was directed to one of two alternative resins disclosed in prior art reference, even though reference described claimed resin as "inferior."
  4. Para-Ordnance Manufacturing, Inc. v. SGS Importers International, Inc.

    73 F.3d 1085 (Fed. Cir. 1995)   Cited 80 times
    Explaining that "[f]rom the decision of the district court, we can, and do, accept the implicit fact-finding"
  5. In re Bell

    991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 32 times   1 Legal Analyses

    No. 92-1375. April 20, 1993. Robert P. Blackburn, Chiron Corp., Emeryville, CA, argued for appellant. With him on the brief were Debra A. Shetka and Thomas E. Ciotti, Morrison Foerster, Palo Alto, CA, and Donald S. Chisum, Morrison Foerster, Seattle, WA. Teddy S. Gron, Associate Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, VA, argued for appellee. With him on the brief was Fred E. McKelvey, Sol. Of counsel were John W. Dewhirst, Lee E. Barrett, Richard E. Schafer and Albin F. Drost. Appeal from the Patent

  6. In re Herz

    537 F.2d 549 (C.C.P.A. 1976)   Cited 5 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Noting that the transitional phrase "consisting essentially of" permits some additional elements, but excludes additional unspecified materials or steps that would "materially affect the basic and novel characteristic" of the claimed invention
  7. In re de Lajarte

    337 F.2d 870 (C.C.P.A. 1964)   Cited 5 times

    Patent Appeal No. 7237. November 5, 1964. John L. Seymour, Bauer Seymour, New York City, for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C., (George C. Roeming, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before RICH, Acting Chief Judge, and MARTIN, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, designated to participate in place of Chief Judge WORLEY, pursuant to provisions of Section

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,055 times   447 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 182 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)