Ex Parte Garst

11 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,577 times   189 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
  2. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.

    425 U.S. 273 (1976)   Cited 238 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a combination is obvious if a patent "simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform" and yields predictable results
  3. In re O'Farrell

    853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 168 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Finding patent obvious where the prior art provided a "reasonable expectation of success"
  4. Merck Co., Inc. v. Biocraft Laboratories

    874 F.2d 804 (Fed. Cir. 1989)   Cited 48 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the prior art's disclosure of a multitude of combinations failed to render any particular formulation less obvious
  5. In re Hedges

    783 F.2d 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1986)   Cited 16 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Proceeding against accepted wisdom is evidence of unobviousness
  6. Application of Lamberti

    545 F.2d 747 (C.C.P.A. 1976)   Cited 16 times

    Patent Appeal No. 76-610. December 9, 1976. Kenneth F. Dusyn, atty. of record, for appellants; Melvin H. Kurtz and M. Ted Raptes, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. MILLER, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board

  7. Application of Wesslau

    353 F.2d 238 (C.C.P.A. 1965)   Cited 20 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 7447. November 26, 1965. Arnold Sprung, New York City, Arnold B. Christen, Washington, D.C., for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Fred W. Sherling, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges. ALMOND, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Board of Appeals affirming the rejection of claims 35-43 in appellant's application entitled "Process for the Production of Polyethylene

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,174 times   493 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 189 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 99 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)