Patent Appeal No. 7168. July 9, 1964. William A. Smith, Jr., Smith, Michael Gardiner, Washington, D.C., Eugene F. Buell, Hoopes, Leonard Buell, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellants. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (Fred W. Sherling, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, MARTIN, SMITH, and ALMOND, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the rejection of all claims of application
Bankruptcy No. 79-03140A. Adv. No. 79-0046A. October 23, 1979 (Bankruptcy). December 10, 1979 (Adversary). John J. Goger, Arrington, Rubin, Winter, Kirscher Goger, Atlanta, Ga., for trustee and plaintiff. Douglas R. Haynie, Haynie Willis, Marietta, Ga., for defendant Chancey. Alvin L. Bridges, Jr., Dunaway, Haas, Broome, Hope Bridges, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant Hulsey. STATEMENT OF THE CASE W. HOMER DRAKE, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge. On October 23, 1979, the above-named debtor filed a petition for relief
Patent Appeal No. 5554. April 12, 1949. Appeal from the Board of Interference Examiners of the United States Patent Office, Interference No. 81,799. Interference proceeding between George H. Kendall and Raymond R. Searles involving a patent of George H. Kendall, No. 2,349,281, relating to a number of different rotating constructions one of which includes a pulley. From a decision of the Board of Interference Examiners of the United States Patent Office awarding priority of invention to Raymond R
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)
(a) (1) Appellant may file a single request for rehearing within two months of the date of the original decision of the Board. No request for rehearing from a decision on rehearing will be permitted, unless the rehearing decision so modified the original decision as to become, in effect, a new decision, and the Board states that a second request for rehearing would be permitted. The request for rehearing must state with particularity the points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked by