Appeal No. 84-513. June 8, 1984. Jeffrey G. Sheldon, Pasadena, Cal., argued for appellants. John F. Pitrelli, Arlington, Va., argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Joseph F. Nakamura, Sol., and John W. Dewhirst, Associate Sol., Washington, D.C. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before BENNETT, Circuit Judge, SKELTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and MILLER, Circuit Judge. JACK R. MILLER, Circuit Judge. This appeal is from that part of the decision of the
2014-1798 2014-1801 05-07-2015 IN RE: MAGNA ELECTRONICS, INC., Appellant TERENCE J. LINN, Gardner, Linn, Burkhart & Flory, LLP, Grand Rapids, MI, for appellant. NATHAN K. KELLEY, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, for appellee Michelle K. Lee. Also represented by FARHEENA YASMEEN RASHEED, LORE A. UNT, THOMAS W. KRAUSE. PER CURIAM. NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and
Patent Appeal No. 8161. June 19, 1969. Eugene F. Buell, Buell, Blenko Ziesenheim, Pittsburgh, Pa., attys. of record, for appellant. Joseph Schimmel, Washington, D.C., for Commissioner of Patents. Jack E. Armore, Washington, D.C., of record. Before RICH, Acting Chief Judge, DURFEE and NEESE, Judges, sitting by designation and ALMOND and BALDWIN, Associate Judges. RICH, Acting Chief Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals, adhered to on reconsideration, affirming
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)