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Ex parte Duke

16 Cited authorities

  1. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp.

    488 U.S. 825 (1988)   Cited 212 times
    Holding that "one who republishes a defamatory statement `adopts' it as his own, and is liable in equal measure to the original defamer."

  2. Merck Co. v. Biocraft Laboratories, Inc.

    493 U.S. 975 (1989)   Cited 98 times
    Noting that Massachusetts has not adopted good faith doctrine of United States v. Leon

  3. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp.

    837 F.2d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 163 times
    Holding that the burden of proof is not reduced when prior art presented to the court was not considered by the PTO

  4. In re Piasecki

    745 F.2d 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1984)   Cited 73 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding nonobviousness where the evidence demonstrated a failure of others to provide a feasible solution to a longstanding problem

  5. Merck Co., Inc. v. Biocraft Laboratories

    874 F.2d 804 (Fed. Cir. 1989)   Cited 47 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the prior art's disclosure of a multitude of combinations failed to render any particular formulation less obvious

  6. Fruit Growers, Inc., v. Brogdex Co.

    283 U.S. 1 (1931)   Cited 86 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding the Brogden-Trowbridge patent invalid

  7. In re Fritch

    972 F.2d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 32 times
    Stating "dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious"

  8. In re Keller

    642 F.2d 413 (C.C.P.A. 1981)   Cited 47 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating "[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference"

  9. In re Baird

    16 F.3d 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994)   Cited 27 times
    Holding that obviousness had not been shown based on a single reference because the PTO had not demonstrated motivation to select claimed species from prior genus of millions of compounds

  10. Application of Boesch

    617 F.2d 272 (C.C.P.A. 1980)   Cited 17 times

    Appeal No. 79-597. March 13, 1980. Rehearing Denied July 3, 1980. Robert F. Dropkin and Vincent G. Gioia, Pittsburgh, Pa., attorneys of record for appellants. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, John W. Dewhirst, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and MALETZ, Judges. The Honorable Herbert N. Maletz of the United States Customs Court, sitting

  11. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,172 times   492 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  12. Section 101 - Inventions patentable

    35 U.S.C. § 101   Cited 3,547 times   2302 Legal Analyses
    Defining patentable subject matter as "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."

  13. Section 1.192-1.196 - Reserved

    37 C.F.R. § 1.192-1.196   Cited 20 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Requiring "a statement . . . that the claims of the group do not stand or fall together," and an explanation "why the claims of the group are believed to be separately patentable"

  14. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)