Patent Appeal No. 9169. March 7, 1974. Herman J. Gordon, William S. Feiler, Chicago, Ill. (Dressler, Goldsmith, Clement Gordon, Chicago, Ill.), attorneys of record, for appellants. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents. Fred Sherling, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. MARKEY, Chief Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Appeals, affirming
Patent Appeal No. 6080. March 22, 1955. J. Preston Swecker, Washington, D.C. (William L. Mathis, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for appellant. E.L. Reynolds, Washington, D.C. (H.S. Miller, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for Commissioner of Patents. Before GARRETT, Chief Judge, and O'CONNELL, JOHNSON, WORLEY and COLE, Judges. JOHNSON, Judge. This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office affirming the holding of the Primary Examiner rejecting as unpatentable
Patent Appeal No. 5504. December 7, 1948. Appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals, Serial No. 497,157. Proceeding in the matter of the application of Stanley G. Yount, for a patent. From a decision of the Board of Appeals affirming that of the primary examiner rejecting claims 22-25, of the application, the applicant appeals. Affirmed. Huebner, Maltby Beehler, of Los Angeles, Cal. (Vernon D. Beehler and Herbert A. Huebner, both of Los Angeles, Cal. of counsel), for appellant. W.W. Cochran, of Washington
(a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622
(a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)