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Ex Parte Ding et al

13433681 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 28, 2018)
Ex Parte Ding et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. Crystal Semicond. v. Tritech Microelec

    246 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001)   Cited 296 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding "patentee may obtain lost profit damages for that portion of the infringer's sales for which the patentee can demonstrate 'but for' causation and reasonable royalties for any remaining infringing [sales]"; further holding patentee may also recover for "[r]eduction of [its] prices, and consequent loss of profits, enforced by infringing competition"

  2. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Gypsum Co.

    195 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 138 times
    Proceeding to determine whether differences between the two claims are patentably distinct after construing the claims

  3. In re Soni

    54 F.3d 746 (Fed. Cir. 1995)   Cited 90 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding "substantially improved results" to overcome obviousness when the 50-fold improvement in tensile strength was much greater than would have been predicted

  4. In re Robertson

    169 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 65 times
    Holding that inherent anticipation requires more than mere probability or possibility that the missing descriptive materials are present in the prior art

  5. In re Oetiker

    977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 66 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Reversing for "improperly combined" references, because "[i]f examination at the initial stage does not produce a prima facie case of unpatentability, then without more the applicant is entitled to grant of the patent"

  6. In re Pearson

    494 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1974)   Cited 28 times
    Affirming § 103 rejection when § 102 rejection would also have been appropriate

  7. Application of Best

    562 F.2d 1252 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 18 times   4 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 77-509. October 13, 1977. Richard G. Miller, New York City, attorney of record, for appellants, James C. Arvantes, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, C.J., RICH, BALDWIN and LANE, JJ., and FORD, J., United States Customs Court. MARKEY, Chief Judge. Appeal from the decision of the Patent and Trademark

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,065 times   462 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,945 times   961 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  10. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 183 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  11. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 15 times   28 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)