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Ex Parte Dierker et al

12665532 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 17, 2016)
Ex Parte Dierker et al

10 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,563 times   187 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. Abbvie Inc. v. Mathilda & Terence Kennedy Inst. of Rheumatology Trust

    764 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014)   Cited 48 times   24 Legal Analyses
    Affirming a claim construction that was supported by the intrinsic evidence and the inventor's testimony

  3. In re Longi

    759 F.2d 887 (Fed. Cir. 1985)   Cited 107 times   8 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a patent application was properly rejected for obviousness-type double patenting where the prior art references indicated a reasonable expectation of success

  4. In re Hubbell

    709 F.3d 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2013)   Cited 33 times   6 Legal Analyses

    No. 2011–1547. 2013-03-7 In re Jeffrey HUBBELL, Jason Schense, Andreas Zisch, and Heike Hall. Rivka D. Monheit, Pabst Patent Group LLP, of Atlanta, Georgia, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Patrea L. Pabst. Frances M. Lynch, Associate Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, argued for appellee. With him on the brief were Raymond T. Chen, Solicitor, and Amy J. Nelson, Associate Solicitor. O'MALLEY Rivka D. Monheit, Pabst Patent Group LLP, of Atlanta

  5. In re Dillon

    919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 69 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Finding a prima facie case of obviousness where the prior art tri-orthoester compound was found to be equivalent to the claimed tetra-orthoester compound and the use of the tri-orthoester as a fuel additive was expected to produce essentially the same result as the use of the tetra-orthoester

  6. Globe Indemnity Company v. Richerson

    315 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1963)   Cited 8 times

    No. 20002. March 21, 1963. Richard H. Switzer, Shreveport, La., Lunn, Irion, Switzer, Trichel Johnson, Shreveport, La., of counsel, for appellant. James J. Thornton, Jr., L.L. Lockard, Shreveport, La., Booth, Lockard, Jack, Pleasant LeSage, Shreveport, La., of counsel, for appellee. Before CAMERON, BROWN and WISDOM, Circuit Judges. JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge. The questions on this appeal are whether there was sufficient affirmative evidence to support the jury's implied finding of negligence, and

  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,154 times   485 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  8. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 187 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  9. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  10. Section 1.136 - [Effective until 1/19/2025] Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)